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ARTICLE
ACCEPTING JUSTICE KENNEDY'S DARE:
THE FUTURE OF INTEGRATION IN A POST-PICS

WORLD
Daniel Kiel*
In the wake of the most importantpublic schools case in decades, Parents
Involved in Community Schools (PICS), the future of diversity in public
schools is in doubt. This period of uncertainty comes at a moment when
parents, educators, and employers are demanding high quality schools that
preparestudents for an increasinglyglobalized world. Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy, in his PICS concurrence, recognized this discrepancy and
challenged districts to continue the important work of bringing different
students together without resorting to unconstitutional means. Filling the
void between what is essential to public education and what is
constitutionally permissible after PICS, the public schools of Jefferson
County (Louisville), Kentucky, one of the districts rebuked in PICS, have
accepted Justice Kennedy's dare by crafting a nuanced, but still raceconscious, student assignment plan aimed at promoting broadly defined
diversity and increasing the quality of education across the district.
Specifically, the district's new plan classifies neighborhoods based on
student diversity, median household income, and adult educational
attainment, and requires schools to consist of studentsfrom neighborhoods
with diverse characteristics. The plan aims to ensure that the district's
schools will be diverse racially, geographically, and socioeconomically,
thereby capturingthe educationalbenefits of diverse schools.
The Article argues two distinct points: first, that the new plan is a
constitutionally permissible response to PICS and, second, that the new
plan's broadening of both the definition of diversity and the mission of a
school district represents the beginning of a new post-Brown era that is
responsive to the realities of public education in the twenty-first century.
By tethering its analysis of PICS-and specifically of Justice Kennedy's
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concurrence-to a specific response to that decision, the Article provides a
detailed analysis of the new constitutional framework in this area.
Ultimately, the Article argues that because it is both constitutional and
educationally sound, the new plan represents the future of integrationfor
any district willing to make the commitment to providing the educational
benefits of diverse public schools to its students.
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INTRODUCTION
The decision today should not prevent school districts from continuing the
important work of bringing together students of different racial, ethnic,
and economic backgrounds .... Those entrusted with directing our public
schools can bring to bear the creativity of experts, parents, administrators,
and other concerned citizens to find a way to achieve the compelling
interests they face without resorting to widespread governmental
allocation of benefits and burdens on the basis of racial classifications.

- Justice Anthony M. Kennedy'
Since Brown v. Board of Education,2 school districts across the nation
have struggled to ensure that classrooms and schools reflected the diverse
ethnic makeup of the communities around them.3 For many districts and

for many years, this task was pursued under court order.4 Some districts,
however, resolved to strive for the educational benefits of diverse
classrooms absent a court order or to continue reaching for diversity even
after such a court order was lifted. 5 These districts voluntarily established

race-conscious student assignment plans that helped prevent a return to the
6
racially isolated school environments confronted in Brown.
In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down such voluntary plans as

unconstitutional. 7 In the wake of this decision, many assumed that the
decades-long effort to provide integrated schooling for young Americans
8
had come to an end.
1. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 551 U.S. 701, 798
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971); Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Robinson v.
Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 566 F.3d 642 (6th Cir. 2009).
4. See Charles T. Clotfelter et al., FederalOversight, Local Control,and the Specter of
"Resegregation" in Southern Schools, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 347, 383-87 (2006)
(including chart, last updated in 2004, on documentation of unitary status in 100 school
districts that have operated at some point under court ordered desegregation, which is also
available at http://fds.duke.edu/db?attachment-34-- 1621 -view-282).
5. See, e.g., PICS, 551 U.S. 701. In ParentsInvolved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1 (PICS), the U.S. Supreme Court considered plans from districts
representing each of these types. Seattle School District, No. 1, had pursued integration
despite never having been subject to a desegregation court order. Id. at 712-13. The other
district, Jefferson County Public Schools, had been declared unitary in 2000. Id. at 715-16.
6. Id. at711-12,716.
7. Id. at 747-48.
8. See, e.g., D. Marvin Jones, Plessy's Ghost: Grutter, Seattle, and the Quiet Reversal
of Brown, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 583, 609 (2008) (claiming that the dream that an integrated
society could be achieved through law is dead); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Susan Eaton,
From Little Rock to Seattle and Louisville: Is 'All Deliberate Speed' Stuck in Reverse?, 30
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 279, 285 (2008) (noting that the Court has taken away "the
most effective, proven tools educators had" for achieving the aspirations of Brown v. Board
of Education); Jesse Jackson, Blatant JudicialActivism, CINCINNATI POST, July 4, 2007, at
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Yet, there it was. In the partial concurrence of Justice Kennedy, there
was a dare-a challenge to districts who still wished to provide the
educational benefits of diverse schooling in spite of the Supreme Court's
rejection of two plans directed at precisely that: "The decision today should
not prevent school districts from continuing the important work of bringing
together students of different racial, ethnic, and economic backgrounds,"
Justice Kennedy wrote. 9 Instead, Justice Kennedy dared those directing
America's public schools to "bring to bear the creativity of experts, parents,
administrators, and other concerned citizens to find a way to achieve the
compelling interests" of diversity in public school education. 10
In one of the districts directly rebuked by the Supreme Court in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School DistrictNo. 1 (PICS),1
those entrusted with directing the Jefferson County Public Schools (JCPS)
have accepted Justice Kennedy's dare. Rather than submitting to the fate of
losing hard-gained student diversity, JCPS has adopted a novel student
assignment plan that is a model for districts seeking to capture the
educational benefits of diverse schools without running afoul of the U.S.
Constitution. The new plan is publicly supported, educationally grounded,
and, as this Article argues, constitutionally sound. In a century when the
essentiality of diverse student bodies has been recognized by educators, 12
employers, 13 and even the U.S. military, 14 the PICS decision presented a
10A ("Outlawing voluntary local school district efforts to increase diversity in the schools,
the Court imposed court-ordered resegregation."); Beverly Daniel Tatum, Court Ruling
Latest Step Toward Resegregation, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 1, 2007, at B4.
9. PICS, 551 U.S. at 798 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
10. Id.
11. 551U.S. 701.
12. See Brief of the American Educational Research Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Respondents at 3, PICS, 551 U.S. 701 (Nos. 05-908, 05-915), 2006 WL 2925967, at *3
("[A] wide range of studies demonstrate[s] the benefits that accrue from racially diverse
schools, as well as the harms associated with racial isolation and the resegregation of
previously desegregated school systems.").
13. See Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-214, 02-516), 2003 WL 399096, at *2
("[O]nly a well educated, diverse work force, comprising people who have learned to work
productively and creatively with individuals from a multitude of races and ethnic, religious,
and cultural backgrounds, can maintain America's competitiveness in the increasingly
diverse and interconnected world economy."); Brief of 3M et al., as Amici Curiae in Support
of Defendants-Appellants at 4, Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (No. 011447), 2001 WL 34624918, at *4 ("For these students to realize their potential as leaders, it
is essential that they be educated in an environment where they are exposed to diverse ideas,
perspectives, and interactions. In the experience of the amici businesses, today's global
marketplace and the increasing diversity in the American population demand the crosscultural experience and understanding gained from such an education.").
14. See Brief of Hon. Clifford L. Alexander, Jr. et al., as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 5, PICS, 551 U.S. 701 (Nos. 05-908, 05-915), 2006 WL 2922651, at *5
("The experience of the military in creating a diverse fighting force, and in voluntarily
establishing integrated schools that have resulted in extraordinary levels of overall and
minority achievement, demonstrate the compelling interest in maintaining and promoting
integration in elementary and secondary education."); Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius
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new challenge for attaining that diversity and threatened to mandate that
"state and local school authorities must accept the status quo of racial
isolation in schools. ' 15 The new JCPS plan steps in to avoid that fate and
fill the void between what is constitutional and what is essential.
Rather than accepting PICS as the end of the quest to fulfill the ideals of
Brown, JCPS has embraced the decision as an opportunity to imagine a new
post-Brown era-an era in which a school's racial makeup is important, but
no longer the lone measure of whether a district is fulfilling Brown's ideals.
The new plan endorses not only diversity but also school quality and choice
as guiding principles, 16 a recognition that public and parental support (and
not just racial makeup) are critical to Brown's directive that education be
"made available to all on equal terms." 1 7 Even on diversity, the new plan
broadens the definition to include not only race, but also socioeconomic and
geographic diversity.18 Thus, if PICS is the end of anything, it is the end of
reliance on racial makeup to the exclusion of all other factors in
determining faithfulness to Brown. In this way, Justice Kennedy's dare has
provided JCPS with the opportunity to define the future of integration.
Certainly, some will disagree with the choices JCPS has made and a
challenge to the constitutionality of the new plan is likely. 19 This Article
seeks to evaluate the constitutional questions raised by a plan, like JCPS's,
that maintains a racial component in student assignment in the post-PICS
era.
Part I of the Article provides a brief history of desegregation in JCPS,
beginning with the state of schools in Louisville and Jefferson County as
Brown was decided and continuing through the invalidation of the district's
student assignment policy in 2007. Part II parses the various Supreme
Court opinions in PICS, focusing on three distinct constitutional questions
and the guidance the opinions offer for districts moving forward: (a)
application of strict scrutiny to voluntary race-conscious student assignment
plans; (b) potential compelling interests; and (c) standards for narrowtailoring analysis. Part III offers a description of the new JCPS student
assignment plan, following its development from conception to adoption.
Finally, Part IV offers a constitutional evaluation of the new plan,
W. Becton, Jr. et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5, Grutter,539 U.S. 306
(Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL 1787554, at *5 ("Based on decades of experience, amici

have concluded that a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps educated and trained to
command our nation's racially diverse enlisted ranks is essential to the military's ability to
fulfill its principal mission to provide national security.").
15. PICS, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
16. Antoinette Konz, Schools Adopt Guidelinesfor Assignment Plan: Jefferson Board
Broadens Diversity, COURIER-J. (Louisville), Sept. 11, 2007, at AI.

17. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
18. See infra Part III.D.
19. Indeed, the lawyer who successfully brought the PICS suit has already filed a lawsuit
challenging the new plan. Andrew Wolfson & Deborah Yetter, Suit Filed over School
Assignments: Use of Racial FactorIs ChallengedAgain, COURIER-J. (Louisville), July 3,
2009, at Al.
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considering the same constitutional questions of strict scrutiny, compelling
interests, and narrow tailoring discussed in Part II.
JCPS is traveling into unchartered constitutional territory with its new
plan. 20 It has refused to eliminate race from consideration, but has
developed a highly nuanced system of classification that considers
educationally and demographically relevant information in order to achieve
the educational benefits of diverse public schools. Other districts interested
in attaining these benefits may use the JCPS experience as a model for
applying the ideals of Brown to the educational landscape of today.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DESEGREGATION IN JEFFERSON COUNTY PUBLIC
SCHOOLS

To understand the current quest to maintain racial diversity in JCPS, it is
important to understand the historical context from which that quest was
born.2 1 The newly adopted student assignment plan, though significantly
different from the previous assignment plans governing JCPS, is in many
ways an outgrowth of those prior plans. The concepts of school clustering
and defined demographic ranges for every school utilized by the new plan
are nothing new to JCPS. Thus, a brief review of the district's efforts at
providing the educational benefits of diversity since Brown is in order.
A. 1954-1975: Segregation and Consolidation
When Brown declared the practice of racially segregated schooling
unconstitutional in 1954, there were two school districts in Jefferson
County: the Louisville Independent School District and the Jefferson
County School District. 22 Both districts operated separate schools for white
and black students. 23 From 1956 to 1972, the districts substituted
geography-based student assignment plans for the former race-based plans
in an effort to comply with Brown.2 4 However, by 1972, both the Jefferson
20. Although not directly related, a plan in Berkeley, California, similar to that adopted
by Jefferson

County Public Schools (JCPS) was found to not violate California's

constitutional prohibition on discrimination on the basis of race. Am. Civil Rights Found. v.
Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 172 Cal. App. 4th 207 (Ct. App. 1st Dist.), cert. denied, 2009
Cal. LEXIS 6661 (2009).
21. See Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 72 F. Supp. 2d 753, 755 (W.D. Ky.

1999) ("Those who have not traveled the full journey may want to understand how we
arrived at this point. When Jefferson County schools were last segregated as a matter of law,
many of the parents and none of the current students were yet born. So we should never
assume too much about the current knowledge of the long struggle to produce a desegregated
school system."). See generally Courier-Journal.com, Timeline: Desegregation in Jefferson
County Public
Schools,
Jan.
29, 2008,
http://www.courier-journal.com/apps/
pbcs.dll/article?AID-/20080129/NEWS0105/80128046.
22. See Newburg Area Council, Inc. v Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson County, 489 F.2d 925,
927 (6th Cir. 1973).
23. Id. at 927, 929.
24. In 1956, the Louisville Board of Education, like urban districts throughout the
nation, substituted a geography-based student assignment plan to replace race-based student
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County School District and the Louisville Independent School District
remained highly segregated. 25 Given the lack of progress toward
integration, local African American plaintiffs filed desegregation suits
against both the Louisville Independent School District and Jefferson
County School District. The cases were consolidated, and, in 1973, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that neither district had
liberated itself of the "vestiges of state-imposed segregation." 26 Further,
the court held that the lines between the two districts could "impose no
barrier" to achieving the mandate of eliminating those vestiges. 2 7 The
Supreme Court vacated that judgment on the same day that it decided
Milliken v. Bradley,28 a 5-4 decision holding that state-created district lines
could not be ignored in devising an appropriate desegregation plan in
Detroit. 29 On remand, rather than separate the remedies for the two
districts, the Sixth Circuit distinguished Milliken and again held that the
School District and Jefferson
lines between the Louisville Independent
30
County School District could be crossed.
Before the Milliken question of interdistrict remedies could be addressed
again in court, the Kentucky State Board of Education ordered the merger
of the Jefferson County School District and Louisville Independent School

assignments in an effort to achieve integration. The plan also included an open transfer
policy. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 551 U.S. 701,
813-14 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
25. Id. (noting that "[a]pproximately half the district's public school enrollment was
black; about half was white. Fourteen of the district's nineteen non-vocational middle and
high schools were close to totally black or totally white. Nineteen of the district's forty-six
elementary schools were between 80% and 100% black. Twenty-one elementary schools
were between roughly 90% and 100% white"); see also Newburg, 489 F.2d at 929 ("A
school system that has had a history of state-imposed segregation has not fully converted to a
unitary system when 56% of all of its black elementary students attend three out of seventyfour elementary schools. This is particularly so when these schools are surrounded by
several all-white or virtually all-white schools."); id. at 930 ("The evidence indicates that
over 80% of the schools in Louisville are racially identifiable . .. five out of the six
academic senior high schools, nine out of the thirteen junior high schools and forty out of the
forty-six elementary schools are racially identifiable schools.").
26. Newburg, 489 F.2d at 932.
27. Id.
28. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
29. Id. at 746-47. The Court instructed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
to reconsider its decision with regard to the schools in Jefferson County in light of its
Milliken v. Bradley decision. Bd. of Educ. v. Newburg Area Council, Inc., 418 U.S. 918, 918
(1974).
30. Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358, 1359, 1361 (6th Cir.
1974). In Milliken, the suburban districts in Detroit had never been found to have
unconstitutionally segregated public schools. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 721-22. This was in
contrast to the situation in Jefferson County, where both the Louisville Independent School
District and the Jefferson County School District had previously been found to have violated
the Constitution. See Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358 (W.D.
Ky. 2000).
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District on February 28, 1975. 3 1 The new district, dubbed Jefferson County
Public Schools, served approximately 150,000 students, approximately 17%
of whom were black. 32
B. 1975-2000: Desegregation Under Court Order
The districts having merged and the Milliken question having become
moot, 3 3 the district court in 1975 formulated a desegregation plan for the
consolidated district that is the foundation for both the assignment plan
struck down in PICS and for the new JCPS plan. Using the guiding
principles of stability, equity, predictability, and simplicity, the 1975 order
required elementary schools to enroll 12-40% black students and required
secondary schools to enroll 12.5-35% black students. 34 By 1978, the
district court was satisfied with the district's efforts to meet the targets and
35
removed the case from the active docket.
A decade later, demographic changes in the community had caused a
number of schools to fall outside of the 1975 guidelines, and the Board of
Education responded in 1984 by amending school zone boundaries and
establishing magnet schools to encourage diverse enrollments. 36 In 1991,
the district expanded magnet school opportunities and adopted a new plan,
"Project Renaissance," that emphasized student choice along with the racial
guidelines of the previous plan. 37 The racial makeup guidelines were
adjusted on several occasions, and by 1996, the district required each school
to have African American enrollments of between 15 and 50%.38
The strict racial guidelines imposed by the various plans applied to all
schools, including magnet schools. Unhappy that the guidelines were
limiting black enrollment at Central High School, a magnet school, six
31. Cunningham v. Grayson, 541 F.2d 538, 539 (6th Cir. 1976); see also Newburg Area

Council, Inc. v. Gordon, 521 F.2d 578, 580 (6th Cir. 1975).
32. Gordon, 521 F.2d at 581.
33. Id. at 580.
34. Cunningham, 541 F.2d at 540; see Hampton, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 762.
35. Hampton, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 772 (noting that placing the case on inactive status "'will
not impede this Court from enforcing such portions of its desegregation order as are of a
continuing nature"' (quoting Haycraft v. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 7045, 7291, mem. op. at 12
(W.D. Ky. June 15, 1978))).

36. Hampton, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 766.
37. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 551 U.S. 701,
816-17 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[The new plan] provided that each elementary

school would have a black student population of between 15% and 50%; each middle and
high school would have a black population and a white population that fell within a range,
the boundaries of which were set at 15% above and 15% below the general student
population percentages in the county at that grade level. The plan then drew new
geographical school assignment zones designed to satisfy these guidelines; the district could
reassign students if particular schools failed to meet the guidelines and was required to do so
if a school repeatedly missed these targets.").
38. Hampton, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 767-68. The new plan was called a "managed choice"
plan. Id. at 767. School assignment zones were redrawn and greater choice was offered to
parents of elementary and middle school students. Id.
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African American parents sued in 1998 to eliminate the racial guidelines at
Central. 39 Ultimately, in pursuing their case, the parents moved to dissolve
the district court's 1975 decree, an order that had been inactive but was still
in effect. 40 Given that it was African American parents who were asking

for an end to court supervision of the district's desegregation efforts and
citing the school board's "extraordinary good faith," the district court
concluded that "the vestiges associated with the former policy of
segregation and its4 1pernicious effects" had been eliminated to the greatest
extent practicable.
Having so dissolved the 1975 decree, the district court ruled against the
use of racial quotas in magnet programs, such as the one at Central High
School, as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 42 Recognizing that
the board may have "compelling reasons to continue a fully integrated
school system in all other schools," the district court limited its holding to
the issues presented-use of the racial guidelines in magnet schools-and
explicitly did not require any other changes to the district's student
assignment plan. 43 Looking to the future, the district court expressed
confidence in the board's continued comnmitment to maintaining integration,
school system
suggesting that "voluntary maintenance of the desegregated
44
interest."
state
compelling
a
considered
be
should
C. 2001-2007: Voluntary Integration
Freed from court supervision, JCPS faced a decision of how, and if, it
wanted to continue pursuing the educational benefits of diversity. 45 By that
time, JCPS was serving an increasingly diverse student body; in 2001, JCPS
educated 97,000 students, 34% of whom were black. 46 The district chose to
continue its efforts to provide integrated educational settings and
voluntarily adopted a student assignment plan that continued to require
African American enrollment between 15 and 50% in all non-magnet
schools.4 7 It was this plan that the Supreme Court considered in PICS.

39. Courier-Joumal.com, supra note 21. See generally Enid Trucios-Haynes & Cedric
Merlin Powell, The Rhetoric of Colorblind Constitutionalism: Individualism, Race and
Public Schools in Louisville, Kentucky, 112 PENN. ST. L. REv. 947 (2008).
40. Hampton, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 754-55, 783.
41. Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 360 (W.D. Ky.
2000).

42.
43.
44.
45.
district

Id.
Id.
Id. at 379.
The 2000 decision faced by JCPS is not so dissimilar from the decision facing the
after the PICS decision. No longer was there a court order mandating any conscious

policy promoting diverse schools; any such plan would be wholly voluntary. Id.

46. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 551 U.S. 701, 716
(2007) (citing McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 839-40 & n.6
(W.D.Ky.2004)).
47. PICS, 551 U.S. at 716.
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The board divided the district into "clusters" made up of several
schools.4 8 Initially, each student was assigned, based exclusively on
geography, to a school within the cluster in which he lived, and parents
were asked to submit two school choices within the cluster. 4 9 Decisions to
assign within each cluster were based on school capacity and the racial
makeup guidelines. 50 Once assigned, students could apply to transfer to
any non-magnet school in the district, with decisions again determined by
school capacity and the racial makeup guidelines. 5 1 Finally, any student
could apply to any magnet school or program in the district, and magnet
decisions did not include any consideration of a student's race. 52
In 2003, after their children were not assigned to the school of their
choice because of the racial makeup guidelines, a group of white parents
sued to enjoin the use of the guidelines in student assignment. 53 Crystal
Meredith, the named plaintiff, had attempted to have her son transferred to a
school a mile from her home rather than the school to which he was
assigned, which was ten miles from her home.5 4 Although there was space
in the nearer school, Ms. Meredith's request was denied because "[t]he
transfer would have an adverse effect on desegregation compliance. '55
The district court found that JCPS had a compelling interest in
maintaining racially integrated schools and that the district's student
assignment plan was, in most respects, sufficiently narrowly tailored to
withstand constitutional scrutiny. 56 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision without comment, 57 and the case was subsequently joined
with a related case from Seattle for argument before the Supreme Court. 58
The Court would consider whether the districts' use of race in making
student assignment decisions was permissible under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 59 and, in so doing, would define the
framework for any district seeking to voluntarily establish school diversity
absent a court mandate.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 716-17.
52. Id. at 717 n.17. At the high school level, the district allows for open enrollment,
under which any ninth-grader may apply for admission to any non-magnet high school. Id.
at 711.
53. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837-38 (W.D. Ky.
2004).
54. PICS, 551 U.S. at 717.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 717-18 (considering the narrow-tailoring analysis of Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 339 (2003)).
57. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 416 F.3d 513, 514 (6th Cir. 2005).
58. Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 547 U.S. 1178 (2006) (granting writ of
certiorari and joining with Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426
F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005)).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 7 ("No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
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II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN PICS

In considering the voluntary integration plans from JCPS and Seattle, the
Supreme Court had the opportunity to dictate the bounds of permissible
methods of achieving the educational benefits of diverse public schools in a
twenty-first-century landscape. As fewer and fewer districts operate under
court-ordered desegregation plans, 60 voluntary integration plans represent
the next phase in implementation of the Brown quest to eliminate racial
isolation in schools. This section will describe the positions of the various
Justices in their PICS opinions as they confronted the old JCPS assignment
plan in order to lay the foundation for predicting each Justice's likely
61
response when confronted with JCPS's new plan.
Specifically, the Article will describe where the Justices stand on the
three critical questions of equal protection jurisprudence: (1) application of
strict scrutiny to voluntary race-conscious student assignment plans, (2)
possibilities for compelling interests to be achieved through such plans, and
(3) standards for narrow-tailoring analysis. Of particular importance is the
partial concurrence of Justice Kennedy, who provided the crucial fifth vote
for the Court's conclusion that both districts' plans violated the Equal
Protection Clause. 62 Justice Kennedy also provided the fifth vote for the
Court's holdings that strict scrutiny will be triggered whenever an
individual's race is taken into account in making a student assignment
decision 63 and that it is a compelling state interest for a district to seek to
avoid racial isolation in schools and to attain the educational benefits of
diverse schools. 64 Although Justice Kennedy agreed with the plurality
conclusion that the plans before the Court were not narrowly tailored, he
seemed to apply a different standard, making the guidance on this point less
clear. Given the importance of Justice Kennedy's position and vote, the
analysis below will pay special attention to the areas where Justice
Kennedy's partial concurrence concurs with Chief Justice John G. Roberts,
60. See Clotfelter et al., supra note 4, at 383-87.
61. Five Justices submitted opinions in the case. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.,
authored a plurality opinion, joined in its entirety by Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, Jr., and joined in part by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy. PICS,
551 U.S. at 704. Justice Thomas authored a concurrence. Id. at 748 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Justice Kennedy authored a partial concurrence and concurred in the result. Id.
at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Stephen G.
Breyer authored a comprehensive dissent that was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens,
David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Id. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Finally,
Justice Stevens submitted a brief dissent. Id. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 782-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 783 ("These plans classify individuals by race and allocate benefits and
burdens on that basis; and as a result, they are to be subjected to strict scrutiny." (citing
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505-06 (2005))).
64. Id. at 792, 797-98 ("A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation ....
Likewise, a district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student
population.") (agreeing with Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg in this
conclusion).

2884

FORDHAMLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 78

Jr.'s, plurality opinion, where it explicitly departs from that opinion, and
where it seems to agree with the dissent of Justice Stephen G. Breyer.
A. Application of Strict Scrutiny to Voluntary Race-Conscious Student
Assignment Plans
1. Opinions of the PICS Court
The first clash among the Justices was whether to apply strict scrutiny to
the race-conscious assignment plans in JCPS and in Seattle. Although
racial classifications do typically trigger strict scrutiny, Justice Breyer made
the case that the context of that use may call for a less strict standard.
Specifically, Justice Breyer argued that where the context involves racial
classifications that seek "not to keep the races apart, but to bring them
together," the standard ought not to be strict scrutiny, but, rather, the Court
65
ought to "examine carefully" such classifications.
However, the Court's majority concluded that strict scrutiny would
apply. With little elaboration, Chief Justice Roberts explained (in a section
joined by Justice Kennedy), "It is well established that when the
government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial
classifications, that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny." 6 6 Chief
Justice Roberts went on, writing only for a plurality, to outright reject
Justice Breyer's contextual argument, noting that cases "clearly reject the
argument that motives affect the strict scrutiny analysis. '6 7 To allow a
more lenient standard based on alleged good motives would merely
transform "'separate but equal"' into "'unequal but benign,"' 68 an
unacceptable Court endorsement of discrimination.
Although he did not join the plurality in its outright rejection of Justice
Breyer's contextual argument, Justice Kennedy suggested that strict
65. Id.- at 835-36 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In addition to considering the contextual
difference between the use of race to exclude and the use of race to include, Justice Breyer
was willing to allow some deference to democratically elected local authorities to exercise
"the longstanding legal right to use race-conscious criteria for inclusive purposes in limited
ways." Id. at 834. Justice Stevens likewise criticized the "wooden reading" of the Equal
Protection Clause that led to application of strict scrutiny, noting that such "rigid adherence
to tiers of scrutiny obscures Brown's clear message." Id. at 800-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 720 (majority opinion) (citing Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505-06

(2005); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995)). Justice Thomas agreed, stating that the Court had made it
"unusually clear that strict scrutiny applies to every racial classification." Id. at 758 (Thomas,

J., concurring) (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 741 (Roberts, C.J., plurality) (citing Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505; Adarand, 515

U.S. at 227).
68. Id. at 742 (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 638 (1990)). Chief
Justice Roberts further rejected any deference to local school boards, concluding that such

deference is "'fundamentally at odds with our equal protection jurisprudence."' Id. at 744
(quoting Johnson, 543 U.S. at 506 n. 1) ("'We put the burden on state actors to demonstrate
that their race-based policies are justified."' (quoting Johnson, 543 U.S. at 506 n.1)).
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scrutiny would apply to any race-conscious plan regardless of the local
authorities' stated purpose. 69 For Justice Kennedy, the reduction of an
individual to an assigned racial identity would always trigger strict
scrutiny. 70 Although the plans before the Court clearly did so reduce
individual students, Justice Kennedy usefully provided a list of raceconscious policies that would not, including "strategic site selection of new
schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the
demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs;
recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking
enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race. 7 1 While the
plurality explicitly expressed no opinion on such other means, 72 there is a
clear majority (consisting of Justice Kennedy, along with Justice Breyer,
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and John Paul Stevens, who signed Justice
Breyer's dissent, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor 73) for a lowered level of
scrutiny for these policies.
2. Guidance: When Will Strict Scrutiny Be Triggered?
As an initial matter, the PICS holding does not apply to student
assignment policies aimed at achieving diversity or avoiding racial isolation
that do not consider race. Such plans may consider non-racial factors, such
as socioeconomic status or geography, without triggering the strict scrutiny
standard. While districts should-indeed, must-first consider such raceneutral alternatives, the experiences of several districts that have attempted
to implement such plans demonstrate that these policies often fail to achieve
74
or maintain racial diversity.
69. Id. at 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]here is simply no way of determining what
classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics." (quoting Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion))).
70. Id. at 795 ("Reduction of an individual to an assigned racial identity for differential
treatment is among the most pernicious actions our government can undertake.").
71. Id. at 789.
72. Id. at 745 (Roberts, C.J., plurality) ("These other means-e.g., where to construct
new schools, how to allocate resources among schools, and which academic offerings to
provide to attract students to certain schools-implicate different considerations than the
explicit racial classifications at issue in these cases, and we express no opinion on their
validity-not even in dicta.").
73. Although there is nothing in her record that directly suggests that Justice Sonia
Sotomayor would agree with the thrust of Justice Breyer's dissent, her appointment by a
President whose position is typically in stronger agreement with the PICS dissenters suggests
that Justice Sotomayor would vote-as Justice Souter did-with Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
and Stevens.
74. See Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, The Academic Consequences of Desegregation and
Segregation: Evidence from the Charlotte-MecklenburgSchools, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1513,

1556-58 (2003) (noting that in the year following elimination of a race-conscious plan in
Charlotte, the percentage of black students in racially isolated schools jumped eleven
percentage points); CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, DENVER PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
RESEGREGATION,

LATINO

STYLE

9

(2006),

available

at
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Districts committed to diverse schools may therefore be tempted to use
race in some way in making student assignments. For assignment plans that
do consider a student's individual race, the guidance is unambiguous:
motives for making the racial classifications are not relevant; strict scrutiny
will always be applied. However, some race-conscious plans that do not
make individual racial classifications will not trigger strict scrutiny. 75 Such
policies may explicitly consider the racial makeup of a geographic area in
drawing attendance zones or selecting sites for new schools; so long as they
do not classify individuals based on race, they will not be subjected to strict
76
scrutiny.
B. Possibilitiesfor Compelling Interests To Be Achieved Through Such
Plans
1. Opinions of the PICSCourt
Prior to PICS,the Supreme Court had recognized two distinct compelling
interests that could satisfy the strict scrutiny triggered when a state actor
uses race in making decisions related to education. The post-Brown
desegregation cases established that race could constitutionally be
considered to remedy the effects of past intentional discrimination. 77 More
recently, the Court had recognized that race could be considered in
admissions programs aimed at achieving the compelling interest of diversity
in higher education. 78 The PICS majority, including Justice Kennedy, held
that neither of these interests was directly applicable to the student
assignment plans from Seattle or Jefferson County. 79 A new compelling
80
interest would be required to justify the plans' use of racial classifications.
Five Justices found such an interest.

http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/Denver Reseg.pdf
(describing
increase in racial isolation in Denver following elimination of race-conscious assignment
plan).
75. PICS, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
76. Id. (providing a list of race-conscious plans that would not trigger strict scrutiny).
77. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992).
78. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
79. PICS, 551 U.S. at 720-21 (Roberts, C.J., plurality). Chief Justice Roberts read these
two interests narrowly, concluding that the remedial interest could only apply after a formal
judicial finding of state-sponsored segregation in schools and only before a formal judicial
finding of unitary status within a school district. Id. at 721. The Chief Justice considered the
diversity interest identified in Grutter to be strictly limited to the context of higher
education. Id. at 722-25.
80. Seattle declared its interest to be reducing racial concentration in schools, while
JCPS claimed its interest to be in providing a racially integrated school environment. See id.
at 725.
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Although Justice Kennedy agreed that neither of the Court's previously
articulated compelling interests were directly applicable in PICS,8 1 it is on
the compelling interest point that he departs most explicitly from the
plurality. Specifically, Justice Kennedy identified two distinct compelling
interests a school district may pursue: avoiding racial isolation in schools
and achieving a diverse student population. 82 Justice Breyer echoed the
sentiment, finding a valid compelling interest in the two districts' quest for
racial "integration," which he defined as "eliminating school-by-school
racial isolation and increasing the degree to which racial mixture
characterizes each of the district's schools and each individual student's
83
public school experience."
Even Chief Justice Roberts did not directly foreclose the possibility that
such an interest could be constitutionally compelling. Instead, he looked to
the tailoring of the two plans and found that they were not actually aimed at
achieving the interests proffered by the districts. 84 "In design and
operation," Chief Justice Roberts wrote, "the plans are directed only to
racial balance, pure and simple, an objective this Court has repeatedly
condemned as illegitimate."8 5 Since, in the Chief Justice's opinion, neither
plan genuinely sought to achieve the compelling interest of diversity or
avoiding racial isolation, there was no need to comment on whether such
interests could be constitutionally compelling. Although the plurality
opinion seems extraordinarily skeptical that an assignment plan that
considers race could ever be anything but an impermissible attempt at racial
balancing,8 6 the opinion leaves the door open to a new compelling interest
in racially diverse schools-so long as the plan is truly and narrowly
tailored to that interest.
2. Guidance: Are Racially Integrated Schools a Compelling Interest?
School districts seeking to capture the educational benefits of diverse
learning environments or to avoid racial isolation in their schools are on
firm constitutional footing. A majority of the Court (consisting of Justice
Kennedy, Justice Sotomayor, and the three remaining Justices who signed
Justice Breyer's dissent) found such goals compelling in PICS. Diversity,
however, cannot be limited to racial diversity. Justice Kennedy explicitly
81. Id. at 791 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he compelling interests implicated in the
cases before us are distinct from the interests the Court has recognized in remedying the
effects of past intentional discrimination and in increasing diversity in higher education.").
82. Id. at 797-98 ("[A] district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse
student population.").
83. Id. at 838 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 726 (Roberts, C.J., plurality).
85. Id.
86. See id. at 732 ("While the school districts use various verbal formulations to describe
the interest they seek to promote-racial diversity, avoidance of racial isolation, racial
integration-they offer no definition of the interest that suggests it differs from racial
balance.").
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instructs that "[r]ace may be one component of that diversity, but other
demographic factors, plus special talents and needs, should also be
considered. '87 Districts seeking diversity, therefore, must begin with a
definition broader than simply racial diversity.
For districts seeking to avoid racial isolation, some consideration of race
may be appropriate. However, Justice Kennedy makes clear that pursuit of
that compelling interest still does not permit classifying individual students
by race or, more significantly, assigning students to schools based on such
classifications. 88 Again, to the extent a district does make individual
classifications for the purposes of assignment, these classifications cannot
be based solely on race.
Regardless of the stated goals of a district's assignment program, the
district must be deliberate in both identifying those goals and ensuring that
the plan itself promotes them.
Chief Justice Roberts displayed a
willingness to look beyond the declared goals in evaluating whether a plan
promotes a compelling interest. Plans that can be demonstrated to have no
evidentiary relationship to the educational benefits of diversity will be
vulnerable as unconstitutional attempts to achieve or maintain racial
balance. 89 The most constitutionally firm plans will be those that are
tailored with evidence to their stated compelling interest.
C. Standardsfor Narrow TailoringAnalysis
1. Opinions of the PICS Court
The Court's starting point in its narrow tailoring analysis is Grutter v.
Bollinger,9" the 2003 case in which a 5-4 Supreme Court held a law school
admissions program that considered the race of individual applicants to be
constitutional. 9 1 Specifically, in the context of pursuing the compelling
interest of diversity in higher education, Grutter set forth four criteria for
considering whether a race-conscious plan is narrowly tailored: (1) there
had been a serious and good-faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives
prior to adopting a race-conscious plan; (2) the program uses race in a
flexible, nonmechanical manner; (3) the program does not place an undue

87. Id. at 798 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

88. See id. at 790 ("[I]ndividual racial classifications employed in this manner may be
considered legitimate only if they are a last resort ....
");id. at 798 ("What the government
is not permitted to do, absent a showing of necessity not made here, is to classify every
student on the basis of race and to assign each of them to schools based on that
classification.").
89. Id. at 732 (Roberts, C.J., plurality) ("Racial balancing is not transformed from
'patently unconstitutional' to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it 'racial
diversity."').

90. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
91. Id.
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burden on nonminority applicants;
and (4) there are periodic reviews of the
92
program's continued necessity.
Before a district may consider an individual's race, it must first consider,
in good faith, race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the district's
goals. 93 Though the PICS opinions do not delve into the race-neutral
alternatives the boards in Seattle and JCPS should have considered, both
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy were struck by the small number
of instances in which race actually played a role in the districts' assignment
decisions. Such minimal employment of race seemed to suggest to them
that a race-neutral plan could have achieved the same outcome-the
consideration of race, perhaps, was not necessary at all. 94 Careful not to
suggest an endorsement of greater use of race, Chief Justice Roberts
contrasted the minimal impact of the districts' racial classifications with the
indispensable nature of the race-conscious plan in Grutter,a plan that more
than tripled minority representation at the University of Michigan Law
School. 95 In dissent, Justice Breyer searched for a policy that could have
considered race less than the plans before the PICS Court while achieving
the same results. 96 Finding none, Justice Breyer accused97the majority of
imposing a narrow-tailoring standard that could not be met.
Not relying solely on the first narrow-tailoring criterion, the PICS Court
also considered whether the plans used race in a flexible, nonmechanical
manner as required by Grutter.98 Chief Justice Roberts dismissed the
suggestion that the presence of other factors, such as choice and geography,
in the assignment process meant that race was used in a permissibly flexible
manner. Under each plan, the Chief Justice wrote, "when race comes into
play, it is decisive by itself. It is not simply one factor weighed with others
in reaching a decision, as in Grutter; it is the factor." 9 9 Justice Kennedy
was likewise troubled by the assignment of immutable individual racial
classifications: "Reduction of an individual to an assigned racial identity
for differential treatment is among the most pernicious actions our
100
government can undertake."

92. See id. at 333-43.

93. Id. at 339.
94. PICS, 551 U.S. at 733-34 (Roberts, C.J., plurality) (noting that only fifty-two

students in Seattle were adversely affected by the racial tiebreaker and that the racial
guidelines in JCPS accounted for only 3% of assignments); see also id. at 790 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (calling it "noteworthy" that the number of students affected is small and
agreeing with the plurality that "the small number of assignments affected suggests that the
schools could have achieved their stated ends through different means").
95. Id. at 734-35 (Roberts, C.J., plurality).
96. Id. at 850 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
97. Id.

98. Id. at 723 (Roberts, C.J., plurality); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (citing Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
99. PICS, 551 U.S. at 723.
100. Id. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Chief Justice Roberts went further to equate the use of racial ratios based
upon the racial demography of the school district-as both districts had
done-to efforts at racial balancing that placed an impermissible burden on
nonminority students. 10 1 By insulating minority students from comparison
against all other students, both plans failed to satisfy this aspect of narrowtailoring analysis. 0 2 The Chief Justice cited a lack of evidence supporting
the conclusion that the racial makeup necessary to achieve the benefits of
diversity had anything to do with the overall racial makeup of the
district. 103 Without such evidence, it was clear that the plans were tailored
only to achieve a desired racial makeup in schools. "[R]ather than working
forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the
purported benefits," as the law school had permissibly done in Grutter,the
plans in PICS worked backwards "to achieve a particular type of racial
balance."' 1 4 According to Chief Justice Roberts, working05 backward is a
"fatal flaw" under the Court's equal protection precedents. 1
Pointing to the broad ranges for racial makeup allowed by each plan,
Justice Breyer argued that neither could realistically be considered a quota
aimed to produce a particular racial balance. 10 6 Although race may have
been determinative in a small number of student assignments, the dominant
factor in both plans was not race, but choice. 10 7 As such, where Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy had seen a constitutional flaw in
minimal use of race because it demonstrated a lack of necessity of using
race at all, Justice Breyer saw proof that the plan had been narrowly tailored
to the maximum amount because the use of race did not place an undue
burden on the nonfavored population.
2. Guidance: What Makes a Plan Narrowly Tailored?
Districts seeking to tailor student assignment policies narrowly can use
the PICS opinions as a roadmap, albeit a fuzzy one. Before any raceconscious plan is adopted, districts must seriously consider race-neutral
alternatives and establish an evidentiary record of both the consideration of
each alternative and the reason each race-neutral alternative was not
enacted. A thorough record of consideration of such alternatives will

101. Id. at 726 (Roberts, C.J., plurality) ("In design and operation, the plans are directed
only to racial balance, pure and simple ....).
102. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319 ("No matter how strong their qualifications, quantitative
and extracurricular, including their own potential for contribution to educational diversity,
[nonminority applicants] are never afforded the chance to compete with applicants from the
preferred groups for the special admissions seats.").
103. PICS, 551 U.S. at 727.
104. Id.at 729.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 846 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
107. Id.
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demonstrate the good faith required by Grutter10 8 and could lead some
districts to even opt against race-conscious plans, a result that would allow
districts to avoid strict scrutiny entirely. Further, districts should consider
race-conscious policies of the sort described by Justice Kennedy that do not
make individual classifications before adopting any plan that does make
such classifications and similarly develop the evidentiary record of the
09
consideration of those plans. 1
However, the opinions of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy
create a paradoxical situation for school districts. On one hand, districts are
to use race in only the narrowest manner required, yet if race does not play
a factor in a significant number of instances-as was the case in Seattle and
JCPS-then the Court may look upon the use of race as unnecessary. It
seems that if districts do a good job of narrowly tailoring the use of race in
student assignments, they potentially undermine their own case. The best
way to avoid this conundrum is to seriously consider race-neutral
alternatives and keep an evidentiary record of why the use of race is
necessary, even if it only applies in a small number of instances.
in addition, if diversity is the stated goal of the plan, districts should
develop an evidentiary record tying the demographic makeup sought by a
race-conscious assignment plan to the educational benefits of diverse
schools. Rather than working backward from a prescribed school makeup,
districts ought to research what level of diversity is required to achieve
educational benefits and work forward to get there. According to Chief
Justice Roberts, failure to do so constitutes a "fatal flaw" in an assignment
10
plan.1
Another potentially fatal flaw is insulating any student from competition
against all other students in allocating benefits, such as school assignments.
This problem can be avoided by defining diversity broadly and avoiding
making race the dominant characteristic of a student profile. 1 1 To the
extent individual classifications are required, districts must use race as only
one component of their definition of diversity in order to satisfy the
requirement that race be used in a flexible, nonmechanical way. 1 12 Under

108. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003) ("Narrow tailoring does, however,

require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will
achieve the diversity the university seeks.").
109. PICS, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (listing strategic site selection of
new schools, drawing attendance zones with demography considered, allocating resources
for special programs, targeted recruiting policies, and tracking data by race).
110. Id. at 729 (Roberts, C.J., plurality).

111. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336-37 ("When using race as a 'plus' factor in university
admissions, a university's admissions program must remain flexible enough to ensure that
each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant's race
or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application.").
112. See PICS, 551 U.S. at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that districts may use "a

more nuanced, individual evaluation of school needs and student characteristics that might
include race as a component"); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338 (describing the various diversity
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Regents of University of California v. Bakke1 13 and Grutter, it is not
necessary that all diversity components be given equal weight. 114 However,
where an individual racial classification becomes outcome determinative in
even a small number of cases, a district should anticipate disapproval from
a majority of the Court.' 15
Finally, assignment plans should have a mechanism for continued
evaluation to ensure that they are sufficiently flexible to continue to fit the
district's goals. Although the Justices did not reach this element of narrowtailoring analysis, the Grutter Court made clear that race-conscious policies
must be limited in time. 116 In Grutter, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
suggested that the use of sunset provisions and periodic reviews to
determine the continued necessity of considering race would satisfy this
criterion. 117
With the guidance from PICS in hand, those charged with drafting a new
student assignment plan for JCPS had the opportunity to craft a plan that
would both remain faithful to the district's commitment to diverse school
environments and comply with the constitutional standards of a majority of
the Supreme Court.

III. ACCEPTING THE DARE: THE NEW JCPS STUDENT ASSIGNMENT PLAN
When asked whether the PICS decision tossing out her district's student
assignment plan could lead to anything positive, JCPS executive director of
student assignment Pat Todd replied with exasperation, "No. We're
already doing what we should be."' " 18 Todd's comments reflected the
frustration of a school district oft-recognized for and genuinely proud of its
largely successful racial integration being ordered by the Supreme Court to
develop a new assignment plan. 1 9 Other districts that had abandoned the
criteria considered by the law school); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
318 (1978) (describing use of race as a "plus" factor).
113. 438 U.S. 265.
114. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 ("[A]n admissions program must be 'flexible enough to
consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each
applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily
accordingthem the same weight."' (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (emphasis added))).
115. PICS, 551 U.S. at 723 (Roberts, C.J., plurality) ("[W]hen race comes into play, it is
decisive by itself."); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting likelihood
that race would be outcome determinative for some students under law school's plan).
116. Grutter,539 U.S. at 342 (majority opinion).
117. Id.
118. Emily Bazelon, The Next Kind of Integration, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 20, 2008, at
38, 38.
119. See JEFFERSON COUNTY PUB. SCH., No RETREAT:
SCHOOL
INTEGRATION
2
(2008)
[hereinafter
No

THE JCPS COMMITMENT TO
RETREAT],
available at

http://www.jcpsky.neuTPubs/NoRetreatBro.pdf (explaining new student assignment plan to
JCPS parents and stating that "JCPS is often cited as the best-integrated school system in the
nation"); Michal Kurlaender & John T. Yun, Is Diversity a Compelling Educational
Interest? Evidence from Louisville, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED. EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT
OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 111, 136-37 (Gary Orfield ed., 2001); Kristie JR. Phillips et al.,
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use of race in making student assignments found that their schools quickly
became more racially isolated. 120 Many feared the same result for JCPS
under the new constitutional framework.' 2 1 How could a district maintain
hard-achieved racial integration without considering individual racial
classifications? That is the question left open by PICS and the question
Justice Kennedy dared some district to answer. JCPS has accepted that
challenge by adopting a new Student Assignment Plan (SAP).
The task of developing the new SAP coincided with the arrival of a new
superintendent to JCPS, Sheldon Berman. Following the Supreme Court's
ruling, Berman said of the district he would be taking over less than a week
later, "This community really values an integrated school system. It is a
core value within Jefferson County .... We will find some creative ways to

continue to model that." 122 Thus, from the outset, it was clear that JCPS
would not shrink from the dare laid down by Justice Kennedy's opinion to
come up with a way to maintain integration without running afoul of the
Supreme Court. Superintendent Berman recognized immediately the
chance his district had to imagine the future of public school integration:
"Kennedy's opinion provides [the district] with the opportunity to create
123
that."
A. Developing the New SAP

Confronting realities more complex than the arduous but straightforward
task of dismantling state sponsorship of segregated schools, the new plan
broadens both the definition of diversity and the goals the plan seeks to
achieve. 124 Within ten weeks of the PICS decision, the district's newly
assembled Student Assignment Work Team had settled on six guiding
principles that were unanimously approved by the school board on
(1) Diversity, (2) Quality, (3) Choice, (4)
September 10, 2007:

Integrated Schools, Integrated Futures? A Casestudy of School Desegregation in Jefferson
County, Kentucky 1 (2008) (unpublished article, on file with author) (integration efforts
were "voluntarily upheld by residents of the county and viewed with pride as a landmark
achievement for the school system").
120. Chris Kenning, Systems in California, N.C. See Varied Results, COURIER-J.
(Louisville), Jan. 29, 2008, at A5.
121. Editorial, Thwarting Equity, COURIER-J. (Louisville), June 29, 2007, at A1O ("As a
result [of the Supreme Court's decision], the near total racial isolation and educational
despair that pervade so many American cities today are considered constitutionally just; the

racial diversity and educational opportunity that Jefferson County has voluntarily and
proudly attained are rejected as constitutionally unjust. A more bitter or unjustified blow is
hard to conceive.").
122. Antoinette Konz, New School Chief Sees No Return to Segregation, COURIER-J.
(Louisville), June 29, 2007, at K6.

123. Id.
124. See generally Jefferson County Pub. Sch., Promoting Diversity Across the District
(on file with author) (internal document of JCPS Student Assignment Work Team)
[hereinafter Promoting Diversity].
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Predictability, (5) Stability, and (6) Equity. 12 5 The Work Team added
diversity, quality, and choice to the original guidelines adopted in the 1975
desegregation decree, 126 additions that represent a three-tiered goal of the
new SAP-to maintain and enhance diversity within the new constitutional
framework; to improve educational quality across the district; and to
provide parental choice in a way that maintains public support for the
system.
This three-tiered goal represents the future of integration. No longer can
integration be the sole or defining goal of a student assignment plan as it
had been in the immediate post-Brown era. In an era where fewer districts
are operating under judicial desegregation decrees, educational quality and
public support maintained through parental choice have emerged as
priorities for running a successful school district. This is good for
education. The question is whether the new era is going to be bad for
diversity. Specifically, can JCPS continue to provide the educational
benefits of diversity to its students while simultaneously embracing a
commitment to quality and choice? This is the task the new SAP
undertakes.
B. Considerationand Rejection ofAlternative
Following the adoption of the guiding principles, the district's Student
Assignment Work Team gathered information from other districts and from
127
experts, both national and local, as well as from district principals.
Ultimately, school administrators analyzed a handful of options, including
neighborhood schools, open enrollment programs, an assignment lottery,
geography-based integration, and income-based integration, before
presenting four potential plans to the JCPS board on January 28, 2008: (1)
a neighborhood schools plan, (2) an open enrollment plan, (3) a "contiguous
plan" with multitiered diversity guidelines, and (4) a similar "noncontiguous plan" with diversity guidelines. 128 Of the four, the assignment
teams only recommended two for129adoption, rejecting the neighborhood
schools and open enrollment plans.
The neighborhood schools plan would have simplified student
assignment and reduced the district's transportation costs, but based on the
county's residential segregation, would have quickly resulted in a loss of
125. Konz, supra note 16.
126. Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 72 F. Supp. 2d 753, 762 (W.D. Ky.
1999) (describing the 1975 desegregation decree and its original guiding principles of
stability, equity, predictability, and simplicity).
127. Promoting Diversity, supra note 124. School administrators interviewed officials
from Cambridge, Massachusetts; Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina; Wake County,
North Carolina; Berkeley, California; and consulted with Gary Orfield, John Powell,
Anurima Bhargava, and Ron Crouch. Chris Kenning, District Consulted NationalExperts,
COURIER-J. (Louisville), Jan. 29, 2008, at A8.
128. Kenning, supra note 127; Promoting Diversity, supra note 124.
129. Promoting Diversity, supra note 124.
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Under the
both racial and income diversity in JCPS schools. 130
neighborhood schools plan, 13 1 enrollment at twenty-three elementary
132
schools would increase overnight to greater than 50% African American.
Median household income at elementary schools would range widely from
$8363 to $101,000.133

In addition, more than 20% of JCPS students would

schools plan, a
be reassigned for 2009-2010 under a neighborhood
134
disruption the district did not want to endure.
Under the open enrollment plan, parents would have chosen a school for
their children among all schools in the district, subject only to space
limitations. The open enrollment plan was considered "impractical."
Without anything guiding assignment except parental choice and school
capacity, the plan removed much of the district's ability to ensure diverse
schools and classrooms. Only the creation of additional magnet programs
aimed at drawing diverse populations to particular schools could address
the principle of diversity, an option dismissed based on both the high cost
of developing magnet programs and the unpredictability of the plan's
35
results.1
C. The Recommended Plan
The district's student assignment team presented two other plans that it
did recommend to the JCPS board. The two plans-known as the
Contiguous and Non-contiguous plans-differed only in the specific
drawing of attendance clusters. 13 6 The board subsequently requested that
a single plan, and the Contiguous plan was
the assignment team recommend
37
ultimately recommended.1
130. Antoinette Konz, Berman: Simple Plans Would Segregate, COURIER-J. (Louisville),

Jan. 29, 2008, at A8.
131. In JCPS terminology, this plan is referred to as a "resides school plan." For the sake
of clarity, the author has used the term "neighborhood schools" rather than the JCPS-specific
term.
132. Konz, supra note 130.
133. Id.
134. See id. (noting that 23,000 students will be reassigned under the new plan);
Antoinette Konz & Chris Kenning, Jefferson Schools Unveil Plan To Keep Diversity:
Income, Race, Education Criteriafor Assignments, COURIER-J. (Louisville), Jan. 29, 2008, at

At (stating that the total number of students in the district is 98,000).
135. Id.

136. A cluster is a group of schools among which any student residing within that cluster
can initially choose to attend without making a transfer request. As under the previous plan,
each student would have a designated "resides" school within the cluster that would be the
primary place of assignment. Under the Non-contiguous plan, the district's existing clusters
were modified, but in some cases remained, as the name suggests, non-contiguous with one
another. For example, schools among one of the clusters may be located in differing parts of
the city. In contrast, under the Contiguous Plan, clusters were more significantly modified,
but each cluster would be situated within an uncut geographical border. See generally Steve
Reed, How the Plan Would Work, COuRirER-J. (Louisville), Jan. 29, 2008, at A6.
137. Antoinette Konz, School Board Requests Single Attendance Plan, COURIER-J.
(Louisville), Apr. 29, 2008, at Al.
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The new plan called for the district to be split into two geographic areas,
labeled Geographic Area A and Geographic Area B, with differing
demographic characteristics. 138 Neighborhoods, in the form of census
blocks, would be classified as either Area A or Area B based upon three
criteria: (1) percentage of minority students, (2) average median household
income per household member, and (3) average educational attainment of
people aged twenty-five or older. 139 Areas to be labeled Geographic Area
A would be neighborhoods with majorities below the average median
household income, below the district average for educational attainment of
people aged twenty-five or older (high school diploma with some college),
14 0
and above the district average for the percentage of minority students.
The definition of "minority" was changed from "black" under the pre-PICS
plan to "non-white," a classification that would include 47.9% of the
district's students. 14 1 Areas that do not satisfy any one of the income,
educational attainment, or minority criteria would be labeled Geographic
Area B. 14 2 Reflecting the old plan's student population guidelines, the new
proposals would require that each school 14 3 contain a population of no
fewer than 15% and no greater than 50% students from Geographic Area
44

A.1

138. Jefferson
County Public
Schools,
About
Us, http://www.jcpsky.net/
AboutUs/StudentAssigPlan.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) [hereinafter About Us]; see also
No RETREAT, supra note 119.

139. See No RETREAT, supra note 119.
140. Id.; see also Konz & Kenning, supra note 134.
141. Konz & Kenning, supra note 134.

142. See infra p. 2897 fig.1.
143. Alternative, magnet, and special schools are not bound by the student population
guidelines. Similarly, students enrolled in self-contained exceptional child education or
English as a Second Language classes do not count toward a school's makeup under the
guidelines. See generally About Us, supra note 138.
144. Id.
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Figure 1: Classification Criteria Under JCPS Student
145
Assignment Plan
Geographic Area A:
Neighborhoods where ...
More than 47.9% of JCPS Students
living in the neighborhood are
Minoritv Students

Geographic Area B:
Neighborhoods where...
Less than 47.9% of JCPS Students
living in the neighborhood are
Minority Students

Average Median Household
Income in Neighborhood is Less
Than $41,000

Average Median Household
Income in Neighborhood is More
Than $41,000

Average Adult Educational
Attainment in Neighborhood is
Less than high school diploma +
some college

Average Adult Educational
Attainment in Neighborhood is
More than high school diploma +
some college

In practice, the district would be divided into six clusters of eleven to
fifteen schools each. 1 46 As under the previous plan, each student would
1 47
have a designated "resides" school that serves her physical address.
Elementary school students would choose and rank four schools within
48
their cluster, two of which must be located in Area A neighborhoods.
Students would be initially assigned to one of the schools within the cluster,
and assignments would be impacted by both school capacity and the
diversity guidelines.' 49 In addition, a student would have the ability to
apply for placement in magnet or optional schools or for transfer to any
school.' 50 Assignment of middle and high school students was not covered
by the initial proposal, though middle and high schools would remain
governed by the 15-50% diversity guideline. 11

145. The specific benchmarks (e.g., 47.9%, $41,000, high school diploma plus some
college) are based on the statistics in Jefferson County for the 2008-2009 school year.
These benchmarks will change as the district's demographic makeup changes.
146. Antoinette Konz, Superintendent Supports 'Contiguous' School Proposal, COURIERJ.(Louisville), May 9, 2008, at AI.
147. Chris Kenning, What Do These Terms Mean?, COURIER-J. (Louisville), Jan. 29,

2008, at A8.
148. Antoinette Konz, Diversity Goal: JCPS Less than Halfway There, COURIER-J.
(Louisville), Jan. 17, 2010, at Al.
149. Id.
150. About Us, supra note 138.
151. Id. In December 2008, the district presented to the JCPS board an initial version of
an assignment plan for middle and high schools. Under the new plan, each middle and high
school will have two enrollment areas, one encompassing the school itself and another with
different demographic characteristics-the two areas may or may not be contiguous. Each
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In addition to the student assignment and school makeup aspects of the
new SAP, the proposals included other changes meant to promote the
guiding principles of quality and choice. The district proposed to create
two new district-wide magnet elementary schools and pledged to develop
additional magnet programs to provide greater parental choice and
increased educational quality.' 52 In addition, the district committed to staff
development to ensure that staff had been trained to deal with diverse
student populations, implementation of effective and innovative
instructional strategies, creation of strategically placed tutorial and
enrichment services, and active searching for more teachers, counselors,
53
and administrators from diverse backgrounds. 1
In the months since the district's executive director of student assignment
had dismissed any suggestion that the PICS decision would lead to anything
positive, the district had carefully considered how best to proceed and
arrived at a new plan some thought even bested the old plan. Upon
submission of the Contiguous plan to the board, Superintendent Berman
remarked, "'In the long term, I believe [the student] assignment plan will
help improve the quality of Jefferson County Public Schools ....

I think

we'll have a better balance across the system and that it will give us the
opportunity to do some things that we haven't been able to do before-like
reduce class sizes and expand the number of magnet programs and schools
154
that we have.'
D. Adoption of the New SAP
Following the initial presentation of the new SAP to the school board and
the community, the district made additional effort to solicit feedback.
Through a half dozen community forums, multiple meetings with
constituency groups, and public opinion surveys, the district gathered
further information and made slight modifications to the original
proposals. 155 The poll results in particular revealed the soundness of the
district's belief that the community would support its effort to maintain
JCPS's diversity. When asked whether they agreed that it was important to
bring together students from different races and backgrounds to learn, 88%
school would be governed by the 15-50% guideline and several additional magnet programs
would be created. The new plan would consolidate the district's current secondary school
zones, reduce transportation costs, and would "grandfather" students into their current
schools as the elementary school plan did. Chris Kenning, JCPS Gets Look at New Plan:
Attendance Shifts Won't Uproot Kids, COURIER-J. (Louisville), Dec. 9, 2008, at B1.
Implementation of the plan for middle and high schools, however, has been postponed until
2011-2012. Antoinette Konz, Student-Assignment Progress Seen, COURIER-J. (Louisville),
Mar. 23, 2010, atB1.
152. Promoting Diversity, supra note 124.
153. Id.
154. Antoinette Konz & Chris Kenning, JCPSTo Consider DiversityProposal,COURIER-

J. (Louisville), May 28, 2008, at Al.
155. Promoting Diversity, supra note 124.
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156 In addition, 90% said
of privately polled JCPS parents answered "yes."'
57
that diversity should include racial diversity.1
On May 28, 2008, eleven months to the day after the PICS decision, the
JCPS board unanimously voted to approve the Contiguous Plan for
assignment of elementary school students. 15 8 For 3400 students who would
otherwise have been reassigned under the new plan, the board decided to
allow those students to remain in their current schools unless they chose
59
otherwise or subsequently relocated their residence. 1

E. Early Results
The new plan took effect at the outset of the 2009-2010 school year. The
School Board elected to exempt students currently enrolled rather than
disrupting such students' schooling, thus avoiding some backlash while
taking on some additional transportation costs. 160 As a result, the diversity
guidelines would most impact the incoming first grade students. Once
initial assignments were made, the district received 1295 transfer requests
from kindergarten and first grade students, a figure more than double the
number from the previous year.161 Nearly half of the requests were granted.
The public trepidation evidenced by such a high number of transfer requests
has also begun to influence the thinking of JCPS board members, with some
saying they are "willing to consider loosening" the 15-50% diversity
guidelines. 162 These board members are suggesting that choice, rather than
63
diversity, be the driving principle of the assignment plan. 1
In January 2010, the district took stock of its progress toward the new
diversity guidelines, finding that only forty-two of ninety elementary
schools fell within the range of student population between 15% and 50%
from Area A. 164 Even looking solely at the first grade figures (the only
grade unaffected by the "grandfathering" of currently enrolled students),
only forty-three elementary schools were within the diversity guidelines
range. 16 5 Several schools saw extremely high concentrations of students
from either Area A or Area B neighborhoods-at least three had student

156. Chris Kenning, Poll: ParentsBack Diversity in Schools, COURIER-J. (Louisville),
Apr. 15, 2008, at Al.
157. Id.
158. Antoinette Konz, School Board OKs Assignment Plan, COURIER-J. (Louisville), May

29, 2008, at Al.
159. Id.
160. Konz, supra note 148.

161. Id.
162. Antoinette Konz, Board Members May Tweak JCPS Plan: They Won't Swap
Diversityfor NeighborhoodSchools, COURIER-J. (Louisville), Mar. 14, 2010, at A 1.

163. Id.("'I don't think diversity should be what drives this plan. It should be choice."'
(quoting board member Linda Duncan)); id. ("'I would like our plan to be more of a choice
plan and not a dictated plan."' (quoting board member Joe Hardesty)).
164. Konz, supra note 148.
165. Id.
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populations of more than 80% from Area A neighborhoods; a similar
number had student populations of more than 94% from Area B
neighborhoods. 166 Still, Superintendent Berman noted that two-thirds of
' 167
schools were "'trending toward meeting the new diversity goal.""
These results suggest some of the nonlegal challenges that will face the
district as the plan is implemented. Specifically, maintaining parental
support for the plan even as children are assigned to schools other than their
first choice and continuing to monitor the diversity makeup of each school
will require consistent work on the part of the district. Ultimately, each of
these can be accomplished only by raising the educational bar at all schools
in JCPS, a goal the district is pursuing by increasing school choice options
168
for parents and students.
The district thus faces challenges beyond the question of the new SAP's
constitutionality. It may ultimately be the educational soundness, ability to
maintain parental and community support, and effectiveness at delivering
the diversity sought that determines the success or failure of the new plan.
In other words, a constitutional plan does not necessarily equal a successful
plan. Still, an unconstitutional plan will certainly not succeed, so the
question of constitutionality is discussed below.
IV. EVALUATION
Although there is broad public support for the new JCPS SAP, 169 a
challenge to its constitutionality is likely. The attorney who represented the
plaintiffs in the suit that ultimately led to the old plan's termination has
already repeatedly and publicly criticized the JCPS board for seeking to
undermine the Supreme Court's mandate in PICS.170 In July, he brought
suit. 17 1 Thus, evaluation of the legal, educational, and political merits of
the new SAP is in order.
The lawsuit challenging the new SAP is likely to be brought by a parent
or a group of parents of students living in neighborhoods designated as
Area B whose children were not assigned to the school of their choice
because that school had reached the maximum percentage of Area B
students, or 85%.172 Though the precise situation of the plaintiff or
166. Id. (noting that Roosevelt Perry, Atkinson, and Portland elementary schools had

more than 80% of students from Area A and that Audobon, Greathouse/Shyrock, and Wilt
elementary schools had more than 94% of students from Area B neighborhoods).
167. Id.
168. Sheldon H. Berman, JCPS: The Superintendent's Report, COURIER-J. (Louisville),
Jan. 17, 2010, at HI.
169. Kenning, supra note 156.
170. Teddy B. Gordon, Attorney FaultsJCPS 'Arrogance,' COURIER-J. (Louisville), Feb.
10, 2008, at H3.
171. Wolfson & Yetter, supra note 19.
172. It is also plausible, though less likely, that a suit would be brought by a student
living in an Area A neighborhood who was not assigned to their top choice school because
that school had reached the maximum percentage of Area A students, or 50%. The reason
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plaintiffs cannot be predicted, it is probable that they will be white, and that
the neighborhood in which they live is likely to have a higher than73average
median household income or adult educational attainment or both.1
This section will consider the merits of an equal protection claim brought
by such a plaintiff challenging the new SAP. Drawing from the various
opinions in PICS and applying their analysis to the new SAP, the section
will consider whether the new plan is likely to trigger strict scrutiny,
whether it promotes a compelling state interest, and whether it is
74
sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive constitutional scrutiny.1
Applying this analysis to the new JCPS SAP using the opinions of the
various Justices in PICS, several questions emerge. First, does the new
plan, with its classifications based on geography, trigger strict scrutiny at
all? And if so, is the plan tailored narrowly enough to a compelling interest
to withstand that scrutiny?
A. Application of Strict Scrutiny
The Justices disagreed in PICS on whether to apply strict scrutiny to
JCPS's previous assignment plan. 175 On one end of the spectrum, Justice
Breyer (along with Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens) would have
applied an "examine carefully" standard to evaluate benign racial
classifications that seek "not to keep the races apart, but to bring them
together."' 176 On the other extreme, Justice Thomas appeared ready to
apply strict scrutiny to "every racial classification." 177 The majority,
including Justice Kennedy, agreed that strict scrutiny would apply to all
this suit would be less likely is that one object of the SAP is to avoid the negative
educational effects of racially-and socioeconomically-isolated schools. The higher the
percentage of students from Area A neighborhoods, the closer a school gets to these negative

effects. Thus, the perceived top non-magnet schools that would be most desirable to parents
seeking to avoid such effects will be those not approaching the 50% Area A threshold. More
likely, these schools would be near the 85% Area B threshold, making a plaintiff from Area
B more likely.

173. The littering of this description with "likely" and "probable" is a function of the
plan's broad criteria that ensures that no single individual student characteristic, other than
address, will determine a student's school assignment. Interestingly, it is plausible to find a
minority student from a household with below average educational attainment and below
average household income who would, based on address, be classified as Area A. This
student, perhaps, would be the most sympathetic potential plaintiff. It would be difficult,

however, for such a plaintiff to argue that her race was the deciding factor in the district's
assignment decision.
174. This section is written on the assumption that the current nine Supreme Court
Justices will hear the challenge to the new plan. Although that may not be so, the balance of
the Court seems unlikely to change at least prior to 2013. In any event, Justice Kennedy's
place as the deciding fifth vote for either side seems assured for the foreseeable future.
175. See supra Part II.A.
176. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 551 U.S. 701,
835-36 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

177. Id. at 758 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505
(2005); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,

515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).

2902

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

individual racial classifications. 17 8 Justice Kennedy was particularly
vociferous on the point that individual classifications always trigger strict
scrutiny, claiming that "[r]eduction of an individual to an assigned racial
identity . . . is among the most pernicious actions our government can
undertake."' 179 The first question, therefore, in evaluating the new SAP, is
whether it involves an individual racial classification that would trigger
strict scrutiny for a majority of the Justices. A strict reading of the plan and
of the Court's precedents suggests that it should not. However, in an area
as critical as student assignment and with an issue as controversial as stateimposed racial classifications, the analysis will not stop with a simple
reading of the plan. Although the plan does not make individual racial
classifications, its use of race in classifying neighborhoods as Area A or
Area B is likely to trigger strict scrutiny for a majority of the Justices.
The new JCPS SAP classifies geographic areas rather than individuals.
Geographic classifications do not typically trigger strict scrutiny
analysis. 180 However, the analysis here is not so simple. In classifying an
area as Area A or Area B, the SAP explicitly considers race. 181 Indeed, it
considers each individual student's race in determining whether an area has
the requisite percentage of minority students to be classified as Area A.
Justice Thomas would certainly utilize strict scrutiny to evaluate a plan
using race in even this way.
Justice Kennedy, however, expressly stated that drawing geographic
attendance zones with general recognition of neighborhood demographics
would not trigger strict scrutiny. 182 It is, of course, not possible to draw
zones with neighborhood demographics in mind without first knowing what
those neighborhood demographics are. At some level, even with this raceconscious tool, individual student racial characteristics must be ascertained.
To equate such ascertainment with the classifications Justice Kennedy
condemns in PICS would render his statement that districts are free to use
these plans meaningless. Thus, if the SAP is simply an assignment plan
that draws geographic attendance zones with race and other demographics
in mind, then Justice Kennedy may not apply strict scrutiny to it. Along
with the lowered scrutiny that Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg
would likely apply, 183 the Court that hears a challenge to the SAP will
consider the plan using something less than strict scrutiny.

178. Id. at 720 (majority opinion); id. at 784 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Johnson, 543 U.S.

at 505-06; Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224.
179. PICS, 551 U.S. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
180. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996) ("Strict scrutiny does not apply merely

because redistricting is performed with consciousness of race.").
181. See supra Part III.
182. PICS, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

183. Again, it is not known what Justice Sotomayor's position is on this particular
question, but it is assumed that her view would be most closely in line with Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Stevens.
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Although the SAP arguably fits Justice Kennedy's model of a plan that
would not trigger strict scrutiny-the argument is that Geographic Areas A
and B are merely attendance zones drawn with neighborhood demographics
explicitly in mind-Geographic Areas A and B do not fit the typical
definition of an attendance zone. Students in Geographic Area A are not
assigned to a particular school based solely on where they live. Instead, the
Geographic Areas operate in some ways more like an individual
classification-a student is classified as an Area A student and assignment
is affected by that classification. As a result, the plaintiffs will argue that
the plan falls beyond the scope of policies Justice Kennedy noted would not
Indeed, individual students are given
trigger strict scrutiny.
classifications-a student is classified as being from Area A or Area Band those classifications do affect student assignment. The inquiry in
determining which tier of scrutiny to apply, however, is whether those
individual classifications are individual racial classifications.
Race is explicitly part of the equation. Classification of a neighborhood
as Area A or Area B depends in part on the minority population of that
area. 184 Only neighborhoods with a minority population above the district
average can be classified as Area A. 185 In addition, there is a correlation
between race and the other two criteria used in classifying Area A, median
household income and average educational attainment. 186 Finally, the plan
was developed with the intent of maintaining diversity that had been
achieved through a race-based plan. Because the intent is to maintain
diversity and the criteria relate to race either explicitly or by correlation,
there is room for argument that the classifications of Area A and B are

184. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
185. See Konz & Kenning, supra note 134 and accompanying text. However, not every
such neighborhood will necessarily be labeled Area A. A neighborhood with a JCPS student
population made up of 65% minority population with either higher than average median
household income or higher than average parental educational attainment or both would be
classified as Area B.
186. According to the 2000 census, roughly 43% of African Americans in Jefferson
County have a high school diploma or higher, compared to 54.8% of the total county
population and 58.1% of the county's white population. The median household income for
African Americans in Jefferson County is $24,548, compared to $39,457 for the entire
county and $42,913 for white county residents. See U.S. Census Bureau, Jefferson County,
Ancestry
Group,
Sheet
for
a
Race,
Ethnic,
or
Kentucky-Fact
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?_event=Search&geoid=01000US&-ge
oContext0 1000US&_street=&_county=jefferson+county& cityTown=jefferson+county&_
state=04000US21&.zip=&_lang=en& sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv-geoSelect&_useEV=&pctxt

=fph&pgsl=0 10&_submenuId=factsheet_0&ds-name=ACS_2008_3YRSAFF& ci nbr-nu
ll&qrname'null&reg-null%3Anull&_keyword=&_industry= (follow "Fact Sheet for a
Race, Ethnic, or Ancestry Group" hyperlink; then choose "Black alone" or "White alone"
and follow the "Go" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 9, 2010) (providing race-specific data); see
also id. (follow "Fact Sheet" hyperlink; then follow "2000" hyperlink) (providing overall

average county data).
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proxies for racial classifications.
Proxies for racial classifications may
87
trigger strict scrutiny.1
However, the SAP's classifications differ substantially from the
classifications in both Grutter and PICS that triggered strict scrutiny.
Although race is part of the equation in making a classification, an
individual's race is not. This is vividly demonstrated by considering the
fate of the plaintiff challenging the plan. In the event that a JCPS school
has reached the extremes of the diversity guidelines under the new SAP85% of the student population is from Area B-the Area B plaintiff could
not be assigned there and may bring suit. However, it would not matter
whether that Area B student was white or not. For that student complaining
of unconstitutional treatment, individual race is not only not determinative,
it is not relevant. Certainly, given the demographic realities in Jefferson
County, a student from Area B is statistically more likely to be white, but
such a statistical probability is weak support for the argument that the
188
geographic classifications are a proxy for race that merit strict scrutiny.
With knowledge of the difficulty in overcoming strict scrutiny, those who
developed the SAP likely attempted to avoid triggering this level of
constitutional analysis. By eliminating individual racial classifications and
using demographic-conscious geography as the primary mechanism for
classification, the SAP should avoid strict scrutiny analysis. However,
there is undoubtedly some racial component in the plan. Since the Justices
considered plans that did make individual racial classifications in both
Grutter and PICS, it is an open question whether a plan that uses race in
this more removed way might also trigger strict scrutiny. Although strict
scrutiny does not seem appropriate in evaluating the new SAP under the
Court's existing precedent, the importance of education and the
contentiousness that accompanies any use of racial data by the government
may lead the Court to apply strict scrutiny anyway. 189 Although this
187. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999) ("A facially neutral law ...
warrants strict scrutiny... if it can be proved that the law was 'motivated by a racial purpose
....
(quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995))); Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) ("A racial classification ... is presumptively invalid and
can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification. This rule applies as well to a
classification that is ostensibly neutral but is [a] . . . pretext for racial discrimination."
(citations omitted)); see also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of Facially Race-Neutral
State Action and the Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289, 290-92 (2001).
188. In fact, the statistical probability is not necessarily that high. As of the date of the
SAP's adoption, it was possible that a neighborhood with only 47.9% nonwhite student
population would be classified as Area A. Thus, in some instances, it is possible that a
majority white neighborhood be classified Area A, undercutting the proxy argument even
further. Similarly, an Area B neighborhood could even be 100% nonwhite if either the
median household income or adult educational attainment levels or both were above the
county average. Admittedly, these situations, though theoretically possible, are not likely in
reality, and the author does not have the data necessary to determine if they in fact occur in
Jefferson County.
189. Even if the Court does not apply strict scrutiny, it could choose to apply some
heightened scrutiny to these plans based on the context. The author does not venture to
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Article ultimately concludes that strict scrutiny should not be applied to the
new SAP, the balance of this section continues under the assumption that
the Court will nevertheless apply strict scrutiny and turns to the questions of
compelling interest and narrow tailoring.
B. Compelling State Interest
Based on the PICS opinions, a majority of Justices are ready to find
diversity in public education to be a compelling governmental interest
sufficient to overcome this hurdle of the strict scrutiny analysis. The three
remaining Justices who signed Justice Breyer's dissent, along with Justice
Kennedy, recognized this compelling interest in PICS itself.190 As the
controlling vote, Justice Kennedy's explicit endorsement of both increasing
diversity and avoiding racial isolation in schools as valid compelling
interests solidifies the Court's majority on this point.
Justice Kennedy concluded that a "compelling interest exists in avoiding
racial isolation," 19 1 and that "[d]iversity, depending on its meaning and
definition, is a compelling educational goal a school district may
pursue."' 92 The new JCPS plan pursues these interests and does so with the
interconnected goals of enhancing broadly defined school diversity while
improving educational quality. According to Superintendent Berman, "Our
new goal was to design not just a plan for diversity but also a plan that
reached deeper and improved every aspect of schooling."' 19 3 These interests
satisfy the Court's standard and evidence a district that is pursuing diversity
not merely for the sake of diversity, but as part of its overall educational
mission.
The analysis, of course, does not end there. Most significantly, the
94
diversity sought by a plan must be broader than merely racial diversity.'
Justice Kennedy allows districts to perform a nuanced, individualized
guess at what the Court may come up with, but rather continues with the analysis using the
Court's existing tiers of scrutiny.
190. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 551 U.S. 701, 838
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recognizing the district's interest in "eliminating school-byschool racial isolation and increasing the degree to which racial mixture characterizes each
of the district's schools and each individual student's public school experience"). Again, it
is assumed that Justice Sotomayor would agree with the result advocated in Justice Breyer's
dissent.
191. Id. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 783, 797-98 ("[A] district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a
diverse student population.").
193. No RETREAT, supra note 119, at 2; see also Promoting Diversity, supra note 124, at
2-3 ("[T]he proposed Student Assignment Plan provides the district with an opportunity to
improve integration across racial, ethnic and socio-economic lines, as well as the overall
quality of the school district.").
194. PICS, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In the administration of public
schools by the state and local authorities it is permissible to consider the racial makeup of
schools and to adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of
which is its racial composition." (emphasis added) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
387-88 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting))).
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evaluation of student characteristics that might include race as a
component. 19 5 Although the starting point for which characteristics make
up diversity is the Court's analysis in the higher education admissions cases
Bakke 196 and Grutter,197 according to Justice Kennedy, "the criteria
relevant to student placement would differ based on the age of the students,
the needs of the parents, and the role of the schools."' 98 By broadening its
diversity definition to include not only racial diversity, but also geographic
and socioeconomic diversity, 199 the new SAP creates a multifaceted
diversity goal that follows closely Justice Kennedy's requirements.
In his discussion of compelling interests in PICS, Chief Justice Roberts
evidenced a willingness to look beyond a district's stated goals to the causal
relationship between an assignment plan and the achievement of those
goals.20 0 In PICS, that analysis resulted in the Chief Justice's dismissal of
the districts' stated goals as merely linguistic camouflage for the
impermissible goal of dictating racial balance in schools.2 0 ' It is likely that
the Chief Justice will apply a similarly searching inquiry if a challenge to
the new SAP reaches the Court. Regardless of the fact that the district
professes to be after multifaceted diversity, under Chief Justice Roberts's
standard, if that is merely cover for pursuing an otherwise impermissible
goal, then the Chief Justice would argue that the district is not pursuing a
constitutionally compelling interest at all. The Chief Justice only needs one
additional Justice beyond those who joined the PICS plurality-most likely,
Justice Kennedy-to be convinced by this line of reasoning to muster a
majority for the conclusion that the compelling interest element is not met.
Although Justice Kennedy was not sympathetic on this point in PICS,202
the district position is strengthened to the extent evidence shows that the
new SAP promotes the very objectives it professes to--enhancing
multifaceted school diversity while increasing educational quality. In
developing the plan, the district consulted local and national experts to
compile such evidence. 20 3 The criteria the district ultimately decided to
utilize for classifying neighborhoods as Area A or Area B-minority
student population, median household income, and adult educational
195. Id. at 790.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Grutter,539 U.S. 306.
PICS, 551 U.S. at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See supra Part III.D.

200. PICS, 551 U.S. at 732-34 (Roberts, C.J., plurality).
201. Id. at 732.

202. Id. at 787-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The plurality opinion is too dismissive of
the legitimate interest government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity
regardless of their race.").
203. Kenning, supra note 127 (noting consultation with John Powell, Executive Director
of the Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity, Anurima Bhargava, a lawyer
with the NAACP's Legal Defense Fund, and Ron Crouch of the Kentucky State Data
Center); see also Promoting Diversity, supra note 124, at I (providing a more
comprehensive list of consulted experts).
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attainment-can be tied with research to not only diversity, but also
204
quality.
In addition, the specific drawing of the six school clusters 20 5 under the
new plan will provide for a more equitable distribution of students using the
multiple diversity criteria than did the previous plan. 206 For example, the
wealthiest cluster under the new plan has a median household income
(using data from the 2000 census) of $50,009, while the poorest cluster's
median household income is $32,639-a range of $17,370.207 Under the
previous plan that considered only race, the gap between the richest and
poorest cluster was $8000 larger. 20 8 Likewise, the range of adult
educational attainment between the clusters was tightened, and even the
students in each cluster decreased with the newly
variance among minority
20 9
drawn cluster lines.
In short, the district has developed a plan grounded in research on how to
achieve its stated goals (increased diversity and quality) and implemented
that plan in such a way as to maximize equity across the district. This helps
establish the record that the goals the district professes to pursue are in fact
the same goals the plan addresses. Such a record strengthens the district's
case that it is genuinely pursuing the compelling governmental interests of
providing schools that are broadly diverse and of high quality. A majority
of the Court is likely to agree.

204. No RETREAT, supra note 119, at 2 (noting that research has shown that the
demographic criteria used by the new SAP have an impact on student success).
205. A cluster is a group of schools among which a student living in the cluster can
initially choose. See supra note 136.
206. No RETREAT, supra note 119, at 2.
207. The following chart details the makeup of each cluster under the new SAP using data
from the 2000 census. The information was compiled by JCPS and is available at
http://www.courier-joumal.com/assets/B2106844426.PDF. Adult Educational Attainment is
expressed using numerical values corresponding to a specific level of educational attainment.
For instance, high school graduation is given the numerical value of 3.0.
Cluster #

Median Household

Adult Educational

% Minority

1
2
3
4
5

Income
$34,314
$32,639
$35,166
$45,812
$45,484

Attainment
2.9
2.9
2.9
3.2
3.3

47.8%
47.8%
48.3%
49.3%
47.2%

6

$50,009

3.4

45.5%

Range

$17,370

0.5

3.8%

208. No RETREAT, supra note 119, at 3.

209. Id.; Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 551 U.S. 701,
790 (2007).
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C. Narrow Tailoring
Once the district establishes that the new JCPS SAP pursues a
compelling state interest, the plaintiff challenging the plan will be left to
argue that the plan is not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. In PICS,
the Justices established four criteria to consider when performing narrowtailoring analysis, and those criteria will guide the analysis in a challenge to
the new SAP as well. Those criteria, drawn from Grutter, include whether
(1) there has been a serious and good-faith consideration of race-neutral
alternatives prior to adopting a race-conscious plan; (2) the program
undertakes a holistic, individualized review of each applicant where race is
used in a flexible, nonmechanical manner; (3) no undue burden is placed on
nonminority students; and (4) there are periodic reviews of the program's
continued necessity.2 10 Each of these criteria will be considered in turn.
1. Consideration of Race-Neutral Alternatives
In Grutter, the Court noted that narrow tailoring does not require
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative.2 1'
Rather,
according to Grutter, narrow tailoring "require[s] serious, good faith
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the
diversity [sought]. '2 12 Justice O'Connor's majority opinion rejected any
claim that a race-neutral alternative that would defeat the objective of the
plan being considered or that would negatively impact academic quality
need be considered. 2 13 Plans that undermine the compelling interest are not
rightfully labeled "alternatives." This criterion, therefore, merely requires a
district to give serious good-faith consideration to race-neutral alternatives
that would equally achieve the same compelling governmental interest as
the plan adopted.
In PICS, Justice Kennedy broadened the plans a district should consider
before adopting a plan that makes individual racial classifications. Since
race-conscious plans that do not make such individual classifications would
not trigger strict scrutiny in Justice Kennedy's view-plans that include
race-conscious school zone boundary lines 2 14 -- a district should also give
good faith consideration to those plans before adopting a policy utilizing

210. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339-43 (2003).
211. Id. at 339.
212. Id.

213. Id. at 340 (noting that the alternative mentioned by the district court would "require
a dramatic sacrifice of diversity, the academic quality of all admitted students, or both" and
rejecting that the law school need consider them as alternatives).
214. PICS, 551 U.S. at 788-89 ("If school authorities are concerned that the student-body

compositions of certain schools interfere with the objective of offering an equal educational
opportunity to all of their students, they are free to devise race-conscious measures to
address the problem in a general way without treating each student in different fashion solely
on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race.").
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individual racial classifications. 215 This is the standard with which this
criterion of narrow tailoring will be judged.
For the new JCPS SAP, the initial answer must be that the new plan itself
is actually the type of race-neutral plan that the Grutter opinion compels
consideration of. The district did not merely consider a race-neutral
alternative; it adopted one. If not precisely race-neutral, the plan is at least
the type of race-conscious plan imagined in Justice Kennedy's PICS
concurrence in that it makes no individual racial classifications. The fact
that the Area B plaintiff challenging the plan's constitutionality could be
Latino, Asian, or any other ethnicity evidences
white, African American,
2 16
this race-neutrality.
In addition to the race-neutral plan it adopted, JCPS considered at least
two other race-neutral alternatives before adopting the new SAP. 2 17 A
neighborhood schools plan that would simply assign students based on
neighborhood was considered and rejected. Such a plan would have had
several negative impacts, both educational and demographic. As an initial
matter, changing to a neighborhood schools plan would have required 20%
of the district to be reassigned in 2009-2010,218 a major disruption to the
district as well as to students and their families. 2 19 In addition, the
neighborhood schools plan would have resulted in twenty-three elementary
schools with a greater than 50% African American enrollment, thus
defeating the compelling interest of avoiding racial isolation. 220 The racial
isolation at such schools was likely to only get worse over time. 22 1 In
addition, median incomes at elementary schools would vary widely, from
$8363 to $101,000,222 meaning that the compelling interest of diverse

public schools (with diversity to include income and race) would likewise
be defeated. Given the high correlation between median income at a school
and educational quality, 22 3 the potential for schools with a high
215. Id. at 790.
216. See supra Part

V.A.

Although this is essentially the strict scrutiny argument

reiterated (i.e., because the plan makes no individual racial classifications, strict scrutiny
should not be applied), even if strict scrutiny is triggered, the neutrality as to an individual
student's race is still relevant to narrow tailoring analysis.
217. See Konz, supra note 130.
218. See id.; Konz & Kenning, supra note 134.
219. There are many negative effects with the disruption on students' lives that occur due
to changing schools. For example, students who change schools frequently are at greater
risk of dropping out. Russell W. Rwmberger & Katherine A. Larson, Student Mobility and
the IncreasedRisk of High School Dropout, AM. J. EDUC., Nov. 1998, at 1.
220. Konz, supra note 130.
221. See, e.g., David Card, Alexandre Mas & Jesse Rothstein, Tipping and the Dynamics
of Segregation, 1 Q.J. ECON. 177 (2008)

(studying

dynamics of racially "tipping"

neighborhoods and comparing findings to study of racially "tipping" schools, and concluding
that schools and neighborhoods that reached a "tipping point" were likely to quickly become
racially isolated).
222. Konz, supra note 130.
223. See generally James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 274
(1999) (noting research indicating that where a majority of students in a school are below
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concentration of impoverished students would have frustrated the district's
of such
mission to provide quality education. Under Grutter, the existence
2 24
self-defeating plans will not impact narrow-tailoring analysis.
In addition to the neighborhood schools option, the district also
considered and rejected a broad open enrollment plan that would have
allowed students to choose from all schools, subject only to space
limitations. 225 Although the demographic impact of such a plan was
impossible to project because of the prevalence of parental choice in
assignment, this plan was rejected as "impractical. ' 226 Under such a policy,
the district would be unable to adequately promote its compelling interests
of avoiding racial isolation or providing diverse schools. Under an open
enrollment plan, the only mechanism for achieving these compelling
interests would be the creation of multiple magnet schools or programs, a
financially costly endeavor that would
not, in any event, guarantee diversity
227
or necessarily avoid racial isolation.
The depth to which the district's Student Assignment Work Team
considered
other race-neutral
alternatives before
making
its
recommendations to the school board is not clear. Specifically, it is not
clear the extent to which the team considered the strategies explicitly
endorsed in Justice Kennedy's opinion, such as race-conscious school
228
zoning, strategic site selection for new schools, or targeted recruiting.
Likewise, it is not clear whether the district considered a plan similar to the
new SAP but without the racial component. For instance, a plan could have
similarly divided the district into Area A and Area B neighborhoods, but
classified those neighborhoods based only upon average adult educational
attainment and median household income. Both Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Kennedy thought it significant that the plans at issue in PICS very
rarely resorted to the racial classification. 229 Although the data is not yet
available, it is possible that, just as the racial classification affected only
approximately 3% of student assignments to keep each school in the
prescribed racial makeup range under the old plan, 230 the racial component
of the new area classifications would not affect assignment in a way that
makes it essential to the district's mission. The burden will be on the
poverty level, the number of students who do not meet the "basic" level on national tests is
two-thirds).
224. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003).
225. Konz, supra note 130.

226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 551 U.S. 701, 789
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
229. Id. at 734-35 (Roberts, C.J., plurality) (comparing the minimal impact of the JCPS

racial classifications to the tripling of minority representation achieved by the plan approved
in Grutter); id. at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he small number of assignments
affected suggests that the schools could have achieved their stated ends through different
means.").
230. See id. at 734 (Roberts, C.J., plurality).
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district to provide data demonstrating the necessity of using the raceconscious area classifications to achieve and maintain the educational and
demographic outcomes sought by the SAP. To the extent a completely
nonracial plan could be demonstrated to achieve educational and
demographic outcomes similar to the new SAP, the new plan could be
vulnerable.
2. Race Used in a Flexible, Nonmechanical Manner
Drawing on the analysis in Bakke, the Grutter Court concluded that truly
individualized consideration of students demands that race be used in a
flexible, nonmechanical manner. 23 1 Justice O'Connor noted that racial
quotas, separate admission tracks for applicants of different races, and
insulation of applicants from competition with the entire pool of applicants
would not meet this standard. 232 However, Grutter does permit the use of
race as one factor in the context of an individualized consideration of each
233
applicant.
In ruling against JCPS in PICS, Chief Justice Roberts pointed out that
although race did not come into play for every student assignment, when it
did come into play, it was not flexible, but rather decisive. 234 A plaintiff
challenging the new SAP will argue that the race-conscious neighborhood
classifications are likewise decisive and therefore unconstitutional. The
Court's conclusion, however, is likely to be different under the new plan.
The diversity sought by the SAP is undoubtedly multitiered.
Specifically, the SAP seeks to achieve a combination of geographic, racial,
and socioeconomic diversity. 235 Under the SAP, each school must have
between 15% and 50% students from neighborhoods classified as Area A.
In order to be classified Area A, a neighborhood must meet all three of the
following criteria: (1) median household income in the neighborhood is
below the district average ($41,000, presently); (2) median educational
attainment for persons twenty-five and older in the neighborhood is below
the district average (high school diploma with some college, presently); and
(3) racial makeup of the neighborhood's JCPS students includes a
percentage of minority students higher than the district's average (47.9%,
presently). 236 Race is not the dominant factor considered; rather, it is equal

231. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. PICS, 551 U.S. at 723 ("[U]nder each plan when race comes into play, it is decisive
by itself. It is not simply one factor weighed with others in reaching a decision .... ).
235. See supra Part III.A. Although socioeconomic diversity may not be based on an
individual student's socioeconomic status, the concentration of families with similar
socioeconomic status in neighborhoods makes this diversity achievable by classifying
neighborhoods rather than individuals.
236. About Us, supra note 138; Konz & Kenning, supra note 134; see supra note 186.
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to the other facets of diversity considered by the plan. 237 Thus, requiring a
range of students to come from Area A neighborhoods ensures that each
school will achieve multitiered diversity as follows:
GeographicDiversity: between 15-50% of students from Area A
neighborhoods; between 50-85% of students from Area B
neighborhoods;
Socioeconomic Diversity: between 15-50% of students come from
neighborhoods with below average median household income;
between 50-85% of students come from neighborhoods with above
average median household income;
EducationalAttainment: between 15-50% of students come from
neighborhoods with average educational attainment below high
school plus some college; between 50-85% of students come from
neighborhoods with average educational attainment above high
school plus some college;
Ethnic Diversity: between 15-50% of students come from
neighborhoods with more than 47.9% nonwhite students; between
50-85% of students come from neighborhoods with more than
52.1% white students.
It is worth noting that this diversity will not necessarily lead to ranges of
nonwhite or low-socioeconomic-status students between 15% and 50% in
each school. For instance, although 15-50% of students must come from
neighborhoods with median household income below average, there is no
requirement that 15-50% of individual students have median household
income below average. So, a student from a family with an above average
household income living in a census block with a below average median
household income would count toward a school's Area A student numbers
even though her household income may be more in line with that of
students living in Area B. The same analysis could be applied to ethnicity
or educational attainment.
On one hand, this classifying by neighborhood rather than individual may
frustrate the quest for diversity in some cases. However, it also assures that
for the plaintiff challenging the SAP, race was not the decisive factor in her
school assignment. 238 Justice Kennedy's concern about reducing students
237. In other words, a neighborhood's failure to meet the Area A percentage of minority
students has no more and no less of an effect on the neighborhood's classification than does
the neighborhood's failure to meet either of the criteria.
238. One admittedly far-fetched scenario in which an individual's race may in fact be the
decisive factor: Imagine a neighborhood with a lower than average median household
income and parental educational attainment level and a minority student population right on
the line of the district's average. This neighborhood would be classified as Area A. If one
additional white student would put the minority population in the neighborhood below the
district average, that student's race would result in the entire neighborhood being classified
as Area B. Then, if that white student were subsequently denied admission to a school
because that school had 85% Area B students already, then it could theoretically be said that
the student's individual race was the decisive factor in her school assignment.
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to an assigned racial identity is absent. Race is one part of the district's
diversity consideration, but other demographic and geographic factors are
considered. 239 In addition, there is no differential treatment of individuals
based on race. 240 The plan, therefore, seems to fit Justice Kennedy's
standard for using race in a flexible and nonmechanical way.
However, there remain areas of concern. Chief Justice Roberts drew a
firm distinction between the hard ranges required by the plans considered,
and ultimately invalidated, in PICS, and the "critical mass" sought by the
constitutional policy in Grutter.2 4 1 For the Chief Justice, the hard ranges
evidenced a quota aimed solely at achieving racial balance. 242 As proof for
this conclusion, Chief Justice Roberts noted that it was not possible to assert
that a school's racial makeup must approximate the district's racial makeup
in order to achieve the educational benefits of diversity without proof that
those benefits had any relationship to the district's racial makeup. For
instance, Chief Justice Roberts pondered how the same benefits of diversity
required at least 31% white students in Seattle but at least 50% white
To Chief Justice Roberts, this
students in Jefferson County. 243
demonstrated that it was not diversity that drove the assignment plans, but
rather the goal of balancing each school's racial makeup to reflect the
Ultimately, Chief Justice Roberts was
district's demographics. 244
concerned that the districts had chosen a range and worked backward rather
than identified the range required to achieve the educational benefits of
diversity and worked forward. The new SAP may be similarly vulnerable.
The plan, after all, does utilize the same ranges, defined differently, as the
previous plan had.
Again, the initial response is to point out that, whereas the ranges at issue
in PICS were racially defined, those utilized under the new SAP are
prescribed geographicalranges. Thus, whereas a student's race could have
been determinative under the old plan, it is the classification of the student's
neighborhood that could be determinative under the new plan. The
distinction is a constitutionally significant one. It is race, not geography,
that triggers strict scrutiny and narrow-tailoring analysis.
To bolster its position, JCPS can present educational evidence showing
that the ranges here are relevant to the benefits sought under the new

239. See PICS, 551 U.S. at 798 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Race may be one component
of that diversity, but other demographic factors, plus special talents and needs, should also

be considered.").
240. See id. (directing school officials to find a way to achieve diversity without resorting

to governmental allocation of benefits and burdens on the basis of racial classifications).
241. Id. at 722-23 (majority opinion); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335-36 (2003).
242. PICS, 551 U.S. at 726 (Roberts, C.J., plurality) ("In design and operation, the plans

are directed only to racial balance, pure and simple, an objective this Court has repeatedly
condemned as illegitimate.").
243. Id.

244. Id. at 726-27.
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For instance, data showing the negative educational effect of
schools populated with high concentrations of students from disadvantaged
socioeconomic circumstances and/or students with parents who have below
average educational attainment would help justify the use of the ranges to
achieve those benefits. 246 In addition, the district can point to data on the
positive educational effects of racially integrated schools and the difficulty
of maintaining racial diversity once a school's minority population reaches
a certain "tipping point" as evidence justifying the consideration of race and
the ranges imposed. 2 47 Ultimately, to satisfy Chief Justice Roberts's strict
scrutiny (assuming such would be applied), the district must be able to
show that its ranges are tailored specifically to the educational benefits of
diversity or to avoiding racially isolated schools-i.e., they are not simply
aimed at guaranteeing a prescribed racial makeup of a school. A significant
argument in the district's favor on this point is that the new plan does not
guarantee any particular racial makeup in any school-it is theoretically
possible, though not realistic, to have 248
a single-race school that complies
with the 15-50% geographic guidelines.
Whether the new plan satisfies the Chief Justice's stricter standard for
narrow tailoring or not, the facts that students are not assigned to a school
based on individual racial classifications and that race is only one part of
the district's concept of diversity are enough to establish that race is used in
a flexible manner. The plan satisfies this prong of narrow-tailoring
analysis.
3. No Undue Burden on Nonminority Students
Both Bakke and Grutter suggest that flexibility in consideration of
individual applicants is the most effective way to avoid placing an undue
burden on students disadvantaged by racial classifications. Under Bakke, it
245. The Student Assignment Work Team did gather information from other districts and
consult national experts in developing the new plan. See Kenning, supra note 127 (noting
that officials from Cambridge, Massachusetts; Charlotte, North Carolina; Wake County,
North Carolina; and Berkeley, California, were interviewed and local and national experts
were consulted).
246. See generally Ryan, supra note 223, at 274 (noting research indicating that where a
majority of students in a school are below poverty level, the number of students who do not
meet the "basic" level on national tests is two-thirds).
247. For positive effects of integrated schools and negative effects of racially isolated
schools, see generally Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, PICS, 551 U.S. 701 (Nos. 05-908, 05-915) (summarizing social science data
on these topics and compiling detailed studies in appendix to brief). For data on the "tipping
point" phenomenon, see supra note 221.
248. Although this may suggest that the plan is therefore not tailored to the interest it
professes to seek, the plan should not be judged based on all the theoretical possibilities it
creates but rather on how it applies to the county within which it will be implemented. The
requirement of periodic reviews, discussed infra Part IV.C.4, ensures that were this outcome
realistically possible in Jefferson County, the district would have ample opportunity to adjust
its assignment plan to avoid such an outcome (i.e., a single-race, but compliant, school).
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is a fatal flaw in a program to distribute benefits and burdens without
weighing each individual fairly and competitively and to foreclose from
consideration certain applicants simply because they are not members of a
particular racial or ethnic group. 249 Likewise in Grutter, the importance of
individualized considerations where race or ethnicity is not a defining
feature of an application is "paramount. '2 50 Without the flexibility of a
holistic, individualized consideration of each applicant, a race-conscious
plan may place an undue burden on nonfavored students by foreclosing
benefits based solely on race.
The concept of the final available space was used in Bakke and Grutter to
demonstrate the need for flexibility. Where an applicant is not foreclosed
from consideration for that last spot based on race, she would have no basis
2 51
to complain of unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment.
As an initial matter, it is worth noting that the benefits at issue in Bakke
and Grutter-admission to an institution of higher education-are
fundamentally different from the benefits at issue in PICS and in a
challenge to the new SAP-assignment to a particular public school. The
burdens associated with the programs are similarly distinct. In the context
of higher education admissions, a nonfavored student will be excluded from
a state benefit if rejected under a race-conscious admissions policy. In
contrast, a nonfavored student in the public school student assignment plan
will not be excluded from a state benefit at all. A race-conscious student
assignment plan does not exclude, but rather dictates to which school a
student will be assigned. It is a plan for arrangement, not exclusion, of
students. The burden on nonfavored students under any assignment plan is
thus less severe than under an admissions plan.
Beyond the contextual difference, the burdens under the new SAP do not
fall upon an individual because of race. The plaintiff in a challenge to the
new SAP is likely to sue because she was denied assignment to the final
space in a desired school on the basis of living in an Area B neighborhood.
The Area B designation could have been given to her neighborhood for a
variety of reasons; either the neighborhood has a higher than average
median household income or adult educational attainment, or the percentage
of JCPS students in the neighborhood who are white is higher than the
district average. It is possible that the neighborhood's racial makeup was
not relevant and undoubtedly, the student's individual race is not relevant at
all.2 52 In other words, race is certainly not the factor by which burdens are
distributed. Thus, not only are the burdens less harsh to begin with, but also
249. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319-20 (1978).
250. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003).
251. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20; see also Grutter,539 U.S. at 338 (noting that the law
school "frequently accepts nonminority applicants with grades and test scores lower than
underrepresented minority applicants" as proof that race does not foreclose consideration).
252. Of course, the student's individual race is relevant in the sense that it was considered
in ascertaining the neighborhood's student racial makeup.
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they are not distributed based on race. The purpose of this factor in narrow
tailoring is to ensure that no citizen is made to bear an undue burden
because of race. The plaintiffs race being irrelevant to the burden she
bears under the new SAP, this prong of the analysis is satisfied.
4. Periodic Reviews
The final prong of the narrow-tailoring analysis is also likely the easiest
to satisfy, Neither Chief Justice Roberts nor Justice Kennedy reached the
requirement for periodic reviews. In Grutter, Justice O'Connor noted that
the durational requirement could be met by sunset provisions or periodic
reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to
achieve student body diversity. 253
The SAP requires the JCPS
superintendent or designee to "monitor implementation of the Student
Assignment Plan" and "make periodic reports to the board regarding
implementation." 254 So long as the district continually monitors the
effectiveness and necessity of the SAP in achieving its stated goals, this
narrow-tailoring criteria will be satisfied.
CONCLUSION
"No Retreat" is the title of the district's parental newsletter explaining the
new SAP. 255 Indeed, even in the wake of a Supreme Court rebuke, JCPS
has refused to retreat from its commitment to providing all of its students
with the educational benefits of diverse schools. The parents of Jefferson
County recognize these benefits in their increasingly diverse community,
nation, and world. Their public support for the district's efforts to accept
Justice Kennedy's dare and provide JCPS students with these benefits
affirms the district's recommitment to diversity as a central aspect of its
educational mission.
The new plan, however, is not focused solely on diversity, nor is that
diversity defined simply as racial diversity. By integrating diversity into a
mission that includes school quality and parental choice, JCPS has devised
a post-PICS assignment plan that more adequately addresses the
educational issues of the 21st century than even the plan it was designed to
replace. 256 Sadly, these issues continue to include the primary issue of
Brown-racial isolation in schools. 257 However, they are far broader. The
essentiality of public support for public education was demonstrated by the
negative effects school districts suffered after implementing busing plans to
253. Grutter,539 U.S. at 342.
254. About Us, supra note 138.
255. No RETREAT, supra note 119.

256. Though it remains to be seen whether the new plan can successfully deliver either
diversity or quality. See Konz, supra note 148; supra Part III.E.
257. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 551 U.S. 701, 787

(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The enduring hope is that race should not matter; the
reality is that too often it does.").
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comply with Brown. The demand for broad educational choices for parents
has been demonstrated by the growth of magnet-type programs and charter
schools across the country. The absolute necessity that every school be of
high quality is reflected in the ideals upon which laws mandating
measurement and providing remedies for students in inadequate schools,
laws such as the No Child Left Behind Act, 258 rest. Alongside these
requirements for a successful school district is the demand for diverse
schools in diverse districts. The new SAP recognizes these various interests
and endeavors on a new quest to achieve Brown's forgotten goal of equal
educational opportunities.
JCPS has devised a constitutional plan that ensures both that its schools
do not become racially isolated and that its students enjoy the benefits of
high quality schools that are geographically, socioeconomically, and
racially diverse. It has done so despite a Supreme Court opinion that many
thought signaled the end of integration. In short, JCPS has accepted Justice
Kennedy's dare to "bring to bear the creativity of experts, parents,
administrators, and other concerned citizens to find a way to achieve the
compelling interests they face without resorting to widespread
governmental allocation of benefits and burdens on the basis of racial
classifications." 2 59 And, in so doing, JCPS has helped define the future of
integration for any district seeking to pursue it.

258. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006).
259. PICS, 551 U.S. at 798 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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